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At the inception of The Ouerbein Miscellany in l%r), its
board of advisors proposed to offer the publication once or twice
a year, depending on the volume of manuscripts submitted and
accepted. The publication was offered annually until 1978, when
in that year submissions were not sufficient to warrant publica
tion. Ifecause of the number of manuscripts available this year,
however, we are offering a double issue of the Miscellany. At
least two of the essays presented in this issue were submitted
in 1978. We are therefore numbering this issue as Vols. XIV-XV,
1978-1979.
A main theme of this issue, as Professor Paul Hcdditt sug
gests in his introduction to the featured symposium on Robert M.
Pirsig, is the illusive question of “creativity.” What is creativ
ity, not only in education, but in all aspects of life? Pirsig’s
book has the virtue of pulling this question down off the pedestal
on which theoretical treatment has placed it and handling it more
intimately, autobiographically.
Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is some
thing of a surprising cultural phenomenon in the sense that it is
essentially a philosophical work which has had wide popular
appeal. Once we have suggested that readers seem to like the
book, however, it is important to have some indication of what we
wish to do with it in terms of establishing an active relationship
with the philosophy it expresses. I he essays on Pirsig by
members of the symposium are varying attempts to address this
question.
One of the great scholars of our time, Paul Tillich, had a
good deal to say about the nature of creativity. Put he continually
underscored the notion that creativity goes hand in hand with the
patience of work. Tillich offered a telling anecdote which illus
trates this idea;
A Chinese emperor asked a famous painter to paint a picture
of a rooster for him. The painter assented, but said that it
would take a long time. After a year the emperor reminded
him of his promise. The painter replied that after a y(‘ar of
studying the rooster he had just begun to perceive the sur
face of its nature. After another year the artist asserted that
he had just begun to penetrate the essence of this kind of
life. And so on, year after year. Finally after ten years of
concentration on the nature of the rooster, he painted the
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picture — a work described as an inexhaustible revelation of
the divine ground of the universe in one small part of it a
rooster.
*

Not all scholarly writing attains to the creative excellence of
the Chinese painter’s rooster. We should remember, however that
every catalogue of a library is crowded with the names of journals
in which persons, patiently pursuing their work, have contributed
to the store of human learning. Our main wish for The Olterbein
Miscellany, now as always, is that it may be regarded as a
vehicle for the expression of creative thought.
The editor owes a special debt of gratitude not only to the
writers whose contributions are contained herein, but also to
members of the skilled staff of the Otterbein Printing Department
Mr. Forest Moreland, and Margie Shaw.
’
The Editor

IV

CONTENTS

Creativity and the Quest for Quality:
A Symposium on Robert M. Pirsig’s 7.en and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values. ,
Introduction...................
Paul L. Redditt
A Piety for the Age of Aquarius:
Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance
Norman Chaney
Victims and Villainy: An Expose of the Real Villain
in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance ..................
Margaret Hartman

13

Taking Pleasure Where You Find It ............................................
'William T. flamilton

32

Dichotomies, Delusions and Depression; Deliverance .........
Larry E. <Zox

41

The Lotus and the Wrench:
An Analysis and Evaluation of the Influence
of Zen Buddhism on Robert M. Pirsig ...................................
Paul L. Redditt
Robert Frost Visits Otterbein ...........................................................
Robert Price
Free-Riding with Public Goods:
A Marketing Dilemma ...................................................................
Gail L. fAiller

51

63

72

Contemporary Communal Societies ................................................
Albert E. f^ovefoy

80

The Thinking Man’s Economic System ..........................................
Tom Bromeley

108

Contributors ............................................................................................

117

V

Paul L. Redditt
CREATIVITY AND THE QUEST FOR QUALITY:
A Symposium on Robert M. Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values

The seminar for which the following papers were originally
prepared was conceived from the desire of Otterbein’s team
directing the Project for Institutional Renewal through the
Improvement of Teaching (PIRIT) to address the subject of
creativity. Creativity, in the sense of a holistic and appropriate
response to the ambiguities of social and intellectual interaction
in a complex environment, is one of the goals of liberal education.
In our discussions of creativity, members of the PlRlT team have
found it useful to conceive of creativity as a tension between
structure and vitality. For teacher and student, structure includes
such factors as belief systems, specific goals in presenting and
acquiring information and skills, and a sense of security which
sets limits to the intellectual and social risks an individual is
willing to take. Vitality, on the other hand, includes such factors
as a sense of play, an eagerness for new experience and insight,
and a willingness to risk a degree of security in exchange for
intellectual and social stimulation.
We believe that any attempt to foster creativity in ourselves
as faculty members and in our students must take both of these
factors into account and exploit the developmental potential
which lies in the tension between them. An artist is profoundly
aware of this tension: a painting or a poem must have a strong
sense of structure, derived from the traditions in which it lies
and in the nature of the materials from which it is made. It must
also possess vitality: evidence of the artist’s new insights, his
willingness to take risks. The successful painting or poem mani
fests the tension between and the resolution of these two forces
which, until the work appears, seem at odds with each other.
Similarly, both teachers and students need to take this tension
into account in the learning process. Both need to work from a
sense of structure: their concrete skill and information goals and
their sense of security derived from past experience, their social
relationships, their beliefs and values. On the other hand, the
environment is constantly changing for both of them, and they
need to learn to respond in terms of such creative attributes as
sensitivity to problems, fluency, novelty of ideas, mental flexi
bility, the ability to synthesize and analyze, to evaluate, to
1

redefine and reorganize organized wholes, and so on. Thus open
ness to change is set within a structure, and the successful
learner can accept change and ambiguity without feeling himself
unduly threatened.
In thinking about vitality straining at the restrictions of
structure, the PIRIT team determined to look for someone who
had in fact done or said something provocative, something fresh,
something holistic, something appropo of the college context and
the American scene in general. Robert M. Pirsig seemed to offer
us what we were seeking. He wanted to take a fresh holistic
approach to a society fractured into romantic versus technologi
cal forces. This led him to examine the very foundation of
Western thought and to offer what he thought was the solution to
a millenia-long dichotomy in Western thinking. He wanted to take
a fresh, holistic approach to teaching, an approach which he him
self had hammered out during his tenure as a teacher of rhetoric.
He offered a fresh look at insanity — both in terms of going
insane, and in terms of coping with it. He even offered a fresh
way of conceiving the assembling of a barbecue rotissere; i.e.,
approach the task with a deep composure as a sculptor ap
proaches his work. None of us individually knew how successful
Pirsig really had been in even putting the questions, but we
suspected that in the collective expertise of our colleagues lay
some perspective that might help us evaluate also the correct
ness of Pirsig’s answers. But more importantly we suspected that
the process of reading and reflecting on Pirsig would open us all
up, bringing fresh insights, and indeed vitality, to our structured
thought patterns. Pirsig may be right or wrong, but he does cause
us to think.

2

Norman Cha,ney

*

THE ^GE OE AQIIAIHES,
irsig s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenanct

•j

theme of modern philosophical thought, especially in
existentialist mode, is that we live in an age of anxiLy.
Modern man, so runs the familiar analysis, is an outsider: he
US

su ers rom t e evil of “alienation.” We may characterize this
nian who was once totally integrated (as in a
primor la or mythical time) has become radically split in three
main aspects. He is divided within himself, he is divided from
o er men, an he is divided from his environment. His only hope
or recovery (for those thinkers who hold out hope) is to find the
way to a reintegration which will restore his unity with himself,
IS community with his fellow men, and his companionability with
an alien and hostile outer world.
ut what is the way to this reintegration? Does the way lie,
or instance, through psychoanalysis, or through traditional
re jgious faith? For Robert Pirsig, the author of Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance, neither of these proposed ways would
suffice. For Pirsig, the way lies through the discovery of “zen,”
a term he spends much of his book trying to explain. A main
purpose^ of this essay is to grasp Pirsig’s explanation, and to
place the book in an intellectual context. By means of such
analysis, I wish to suggest an alternative for reckoning with the
evil of alienation than the one Pirsig himself advocates.
Robert Pirsig was born in 1929. He holds a B.A. degree in
philosophy and an M.A. degree in journalism from the University
of Minnesota. In recent years he has earned his living primarily
as a technical writer.
In the summer of 1968, Pirsig and his eleven-year-old son,
Chris, mounted a 305 cc red Honda Superhawk and left their home
town of St. Paul, Minnesora, for a two month motorcycle ride.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is largely an autobio
graphical account of the trip. But the book is also a “chautauqua,
or a long intellectual monologue. A main purpose of the;

'•'Major portions of this essay appeared in the 1976 edition of The
Ollerbein Miscellany under a different title. The essay appears here, in
modified and expanded form, at the request of the PIRIT team.
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trip is to return to Bozeman, Montana, where in the late 50’s and
early ’60’s, while teaching English at Montana State, Pirsig
suffered a mental collapse that eventually hospitalized him for a
series of shock treatments. Throughout the book Pirsig alludes
to “Phaedrus” (a name appropriated from a Platonic dialogue).
The reader does well to understand early in the book that
Phaedrus is the name Pirsig attributes to the person he was
before he underwent the shock therapy that blotted out his
memory of the past. In returning to Bozeman, Pirsig is also
attempting to recall his past and relate it to his present.
Pirsig is a thinker who stands in the mainstream of American
Transcendentalism. Like Emerson before him, who is generally
regarded as the chief spokesman of the American Transcendentalist movement, Pirsig is a philosopher of the self conceived
both as representative and as defined by its capacity for growth.
He is a thinker dedicated to a new or ^*8^^ kind of “seeing,”
ultimately to illumination or mystic vision ( zen ), a realization
in experience, not in theory, of what Emerson referred to as the
seer “becoming” what he sees.
But we must make a basic distinction between Emerson and
Pirsig as philosophical thinkers. While Emerson was primarily
concerned with the cultivation of innocent vision (a vision unin
hibited by inquiry and analysis) as a means of regaining a child
like appreciation of the oneness of the world with us and around
us, Pirsig recognizes that inquiry and analysis are crucial to our
existence, especially in an age in which we are compelled to
think our way through the technomania of society. Pirsig, in
other words, is an Emersonian of strongly rationalistic bent.
ITiough he longs for the intellectual naivete' of the child, he
recognizes the necessity for the intellectual maturity of the man.
How to bring naivete' and maturity, intuition and judgment into
confluence, how to have a childlike appreciation of the world and
yet have a rationalistic understanding of the world — these are
dichotomies with which Pirsig is concerned.
I propose not to rehearse the plot of the book so much as
concentrate on its central philosophical ideas. (Much of the
pleasure of the book lies in the reader’s tracing its plot-line.)
And I perceive these to be at least threefold: (1) the idea of
classical and romantic understanding; (2) the idea of Quality;
and (3) the idea of zen. We will discuss each of these in turn.
Classical and romantic understanding. Pirsig assumes that
there are at least two basic modes of human understanding:
4

classical and romantic. He describes th
ese two modes in the
following manner:
A classical understanding sees the wnrl.)
underlying form itself. A romantic understandinT^"^
primarily in terms of immediate appearance If ^
show an engine or a mechanical drawing or^°el T" •°
schematic to a romantic it is unlikely he would

1.1., I, ha. .o app.., haa.L. .L" a.,"'h^t

Its surface. Dull, complex lists of names, lines and
numbers. Nothing interesting. But if you were to show the
same description to a classical person he might look at k
and then become fascinated by it
u
^ it
within the lines and shapes and symbols is a tremendous
richness of underlying form.
The romantic mode is primarily inspirational, imagina
tive. creative, intuitive. Feelings rather than facts predomi
nate.
Art
when it is opposed to “Science” is often
romantic. It does not proceed by reason or by laws. It pro
ceeds by feeling, intuition and esthetic conscience'. In the
northern European cultures the romantic mode is usually
associated with femininity, but this is certainly not a
necessary association.
^
The classic mode, by contrast, proceeds by reason and
by laws - which are themselves underlying forms of thought
and behavior. In the European cultures it is primarily a
masculine mode and the fields of science, law and medicine
are unattractive to women largely for this reason. Although
motorcycle riding is romantic, motorcycle maintenance is
purely classic. The dirt, the grease, the mastery of under
lying form required all give it such a negative romantic
appeal that women never go near it.^
IS

Throughout the book Pirsig depicts certain characters as
manifesting either a classical or romantic understanding of life.
Pirsig’s “Phaedrus” self, for example, was almost exclusively
classical in his understanding (a fact which contributed to his
breakdown). The husband and wife, John and Sylvia Sutherland
on the other hand, with whom Pirsig and his son make the motor
cycle trip, are almost exclusively romantic in their understanding.
Pirsig sees both the classical and romantic understandings as
“valid ways of looking at the world.” Hut they are “irreconcil
able with each other.”2 A main assumption of Pirsig’s is that
authentic existence must be based on a mode of understanding
that is neither strictly classical nor romantic, but that is inde
pendent of the two. And he identifies this mode of understanding
as “zen.” Let us delay our examination of Pirsig’s notion of
zen,” however, until we have examined his notion of Quality.
The idea of Quality. In the book Pirsig touches upon two
thousand years of epistemological theories: those offered by the
5

Sophists, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and others. He is fasci
nated by the subject-object distinction that runs through the
history of Western philosophy. Inherent to this distinction is the
question of whether value, or what Pirsig describes as “Quality,”
exists merely in the mind (the subject) or whether it exists in the
thing itself (the object). Pirsig approaches this question in the
following manner:
Quality . . . you know what it is, yet you don’t know
what it is. But that’s self-contradictory. But some things
are better than others, that is, they have more quality. But
when you try to say what the quality is, apart from the
things that have it, it all goes poo/! There’s nothing to
talk about. But if you can’t say what Quality is, how do you
know what it is, or how do you know that it even exists? If
no one knows what it is, then for all practical purposes it
really doesn’t exist at all. But for all practical purposes it
really does exist. What else are the grades based on? Why
else would people pay fortunes for some things and throw
others in the trash pile? Obviously some things are better
than others . . . but what’s the “betterness”? ... So round
and round you go, spinning mental wheels and nowhere
finding anyplace to get traction. What the hell is Qualitv’
What is it?3

If Quality exists in the object, Pirsig maintains, “then you
must explain just why scientific instruments are unable to detect
it.” On the other hand, if Quality exists merely in the mind,
then . . . Quality ... is just a fancy name for whatever you
like.”4 Neither the answer that Quality exists in the object nor
that it exists in the mind is satisfactory from Pirsig’s point of
view. He describes the discovery he made, therefore, at the time
he was Phaedrus, of where Quality does exist:
And really, the Quality he was talking about wasn’t
classic Quality or romantic Quality. It was beyond both of
them. And by God, it wasn’t subjective or objective either,
it was beyond both of those categories. Actually this whole
dilemma of subjectivity-objectivity, or mind-matter, with
relationship to Quality was unfair. That mind-matter
relationship has been an intellectual hang-up for centuries.
They were putting that hang-up on top of Quality to drag
Quality down. How could he say whether Quality was mind
or matter when there was no logical clarity as to what was
mind and what was metter in the first place?
And so: he rejected the left horn. Quality is not objec
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside in the material world.
Then: he rejected the right horn. Quality is not subjec
tive, he said. It doesn’t reside merely in the mind.
And finally: Phaedrus, following a path that to his
knowledge had never been taken before in the history of
Western thought, went straight between the horns of the

6

subje<'tivity-objectivity dilemma and said Quality is neither
a part of mind, nor is it a part of matter. It is a third entity
which is independent of the two.5

The acquiring of an understanding of Quality, Pirsig implies,
depends upon the acquiring of a viewpoint for looking into the
essence of things, a viewpoint which Pirsig identifies as “zen.”
The idea of zen. Pirsig makes no claim in his hook for being
fully cognizant of “that great body of factual information relating
to orthodox Zen Buddhist practiee.”*^ By whatever means of
intuition and judgment, however, he seems to have attained a
grasp of the Zen Buddhist notion that there is a mode of under
standing which is an intuitive looking-into, in contradistinction
to intellectual and logical understanding. Whatever else the term
“zen” might mean, in the context of Zen and the Art of Motor
cycle Maintenance, it means the unfolding of a worldview unper
ceived in the confusion of a dualistic mind. When one is under
the sway of the zen mode of understanding, the universe and man
are one indissolvable existence, one total whole. Only Quality
is. Anything and everything that appears as an individual entity
or phenomenon (motorcycle or man), is but a temporary manifesta
tion of Quality in form. Or as Pirsig expresses this idea in his
own idiom again as he recalls a realization at the time he was
Phaedrus:
‘‘The sun of quality . . .
subjects and objects of our
passively illuminate them. It
any way. It has created them.

does not revolve around the
existence. It does not just
is not subordinate to them in
They are subordinate to it!

“Zen,” for Pirsig, in short, is a realization of the oneness of
the world with us and around us. Philosophically speaking, he is
a monist, or one who sees in the universe the manifestation or
working of a single principle.
Insofar as Pirsig’s Zert and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
has won broad acclaim, he is seemingly a prime spokesman for a
mode of philosophical monism which is in vogue in our time. Why
should philoso phical monism be in vogue? We have suggested a
possible answer to this question in the beginning of this essay.
The fact that modern man experiences a sense of division within
himself, from other people, and from his environment instills in
him a yearning for a sense of being-at-home in the universe, a
sense of companionship with the world in which he moves and
has his being. This yearning for companionship may well be an
attempt on the part of modern man to recapture the feeling of
7

intimate belonging that presumably was characteristic of man in
a pretechnological age.®
Of course, Pirsig as a thinker recognizes that modern man
cannot return to a pretechnological age. Indeed, Pirsig himself is
an advocate of technology (as symbolized by the motorcycle). But
he also discerns that as modern man’s destiny interlocks with
technology, he must sustain an apprehension (zen) of that deeper
reality (Quality) which underlies and supports the quotidian
reality of existence. Apart from such an apprehension, Pirsig’s
book suggests, human life is bound to be a pretty lackluster
affair.
But in spite of the merits of Pirsig’s book, at least three
major difficulties confront us concerning its intellectual content.
First, nowhere does a clear explanation of “Quality” present
itself. If, as Pirsig suggests. Quality is the underlying principle
which alone is the (ground of all things, then how can he maintain
that some things are better in Quality than others? Why should he
not maintain that all things are equal in Quality since all things
are grounded in Quality? Apparently he holds to some notion of
the gradation of Quality, which is not explained by his implied
metaphysic.
Second, Pirsig’s positive attitude toward the world of entities
does not positively and satisfyingly include persons. He tends to
take other persons for granted (as is evident in the stoical
posture he assumes in relation to the mental anguish of his son).
Love and friendship among persons may be a concern for Pirsig,
but it is not a primary concern. One feels that his interest in the
world of men is muted.
The third problem that confronts us in the intellectual content
of the book, however, requires more extensive analysis than the
previous two. I have earlier suggested that religion as a formal
mode of thought plays little part in Pirsig’s quest for authentic
existence. Nevertheless, he shares a disposition with many
religious seekers who express a “piety for the Age of Aquar
ius.’’^ The essence of this piety can perhaps be approached
through quotation of a passage by the American poet, Wallace
Stevens:
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole,
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous.
Within its vital boundary, in the mind.

8

Out of this same light, out of the central mind,
We make a dwelling in the evening air,
a w ich being there together is enough.

centra argument of these lines is similar to the one advanced
y
*^116 interest of self-authenticity. Through “imaginanation or meditation the self is encouraged to find its identity
in t e central mind.” The culmination of this process is the
oneself of an identity which transcends the
1.
“'®^*''^tion (‘‘God and the imagination are one”). The
rea ization of this identity, in Stevens’ view, is ‘‘A self that
touches all edges.”11
But is Stevens’ purity of mind ‘‘enough” in one’s quest for
authentic existence? Persons who think in these terms — including Pirsig — tend to have as their goal inner detachment. If one
has a task to perform (working on one’s motorcycle) do it with
detachment. If one must act, act dispassionately, for your true
self is unaffected by anything that you do. Emerson says in his
essay on Self-Reliance,” in a phrase that both Stevens and
Pirsig would approve, that ‘‘Nothing can bring you peace but
yourself.”! 2 When we place our center of balance outside us,
Emerson maintained, we are not drawing upon the strengths that
are inherent within us. Emerson’s outlook has a good deal in
common with certain Eastern religions — such as Vedanta,
Baha’i, and Zen Buddhism — as they are popularly expressed
from within Western culture.13 But Western religions have
traditionally opposed this outlook. Indeed, when Western religious
thinkers encounter the Eastern outlook, as suggested for example
in the work of Pirsig, they may well interpret it as a denial of
God rather than an alternative way of conceiving God. I am not
insisting that the Eastern outlook is useless for dealing with the
technomania of society. My question is, however, whether in
adopting the Eastern outlook we do not lose sight of a conception
of the self that is powerfully and meaningfully at work in the
Western outlook?
In Western religions, which have their root in Biblical tradi
tion, the God with whom we have actively to deal is a God who
acts. He is a God whose will we may seek, whose judgment we
may accept, and whose promises afford us hope. The Biblical
writers have persisted in the notion that man makes himself
through his action, but he does not do so in isolation. He makes
himself through interaction with other persons, and ultimately
9

through interaction with God. A God who did not act, from the
Biblical perspective, would be of no real significance in search
for a meaningful self-identity, for God, in Kierkegaardian terms,
is none other than the “Teacher.”1^ And the self is his agent in
the world.
In the view of some persons, the Biblical notion of the selfGod relationship is rankling, precisely because it seems lacking
in empirical significance. Even so, it raises the possibility that
inherent in all our dealing with the world there is an underlying
responsibility of the self to the world.
Perhaps no recent religious thinker has developed the notion
of the self’s responsibility to the world with greater clarity or
consistency than H. Richard Niebuhr. His conception of the
“responsible self’’^^ places the identity of the self within a
network of relationships, but not in such a way to exclude
relationship to the God of Biblical tradition. On the contrary, he
insists that the self can be a unity, or attain authentic existence,
amidst all the forces and events which act upon it, only if there
is “One beyond the many”^*’ with whom the self can interact. If
the self has its identity exclusively in relation to the multiplicity
of forces and events with which it interacts, it is not one but
many. Only as the self acknowledges in trust “that whatever
acts upon me, in whatever domain of being, is part of, partici
pates in, one ultimate action, then though I understand nothing
else about the ultimate action, yet I am now one.’’17
Underl ying Niebuhr’s argument is a theory of gestalt. We tend
to view actions upon the self in terms of some larger whole: a
social group, a political process, the natural environment. If the
context within which the self operates is narrow its capacity for
action will be limited. The self will not feel a part of the scope
of things, for example, if it understands itself strictly in terms of
a religious sect. On the other hand, if the self sees itself in
relation to One who acts in all things, it will have a quite
different response. It will see those with whom it interacts as
belonging to “one universal society which has its center neither
in me nor in my finite cause, but in the Transcendent One,’’18
the One beyond the many. And this seeing of the self as distinct
from yet as interacting with the Transcendent One has the effect
of drawing us not away from the world in detachment, but toward
the world in passion, as the realm where God acts.
The quality of this passion toward the world has been aptly
described by Kierkegaard in his characterization of the “knight
10

of faith”:
He f'If ^ A
* ‘ ' [^>^Iongs] entirely to finiteness
him'taU' ^
^iight in everything, and whenever one sees
^ Particular pleasure, he does it with the
<;niil *which is the mark of the earthly man whose
tU- ^
such things ... He takes delight in
'
y *tig he sees, in the human swarm, in the new omniuses, in the waters of the Sound; ... he is interested in
everyt ing that goes on, in a rat which slips under the curb,
in the children’s play. 19
*

In Kierkepard’s characterization, the “knight of faith” is “a
man for whom the things of this world are profoundly interesting
in themselves,
whose mind the ‘truth of things’ is not engulfed
an
os in some higher reference, and whose search for an
f
discovery that elsewhere is essentially
ere.
'■'sig, in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,
IS per aps in quest of a mode of existence that is similar to that
o
ler egaar s knight of faith, but his monistic vision disallows
the principle of the Transcendent One who is the Ground of the
self.
In an age m which reputedly “God is dead,” it may seem
credulous to assent to the notion of the Transcendent One who
acts in, through, and with man in the world. Nevertheless, there
IS a venerable tradition of piety in the history of Western thought
- not taken into account by Pirsig - which insists that it is only
on the basis of the principle of the I’ranscendent One that the
self can assume a proper responsibility toward the world of
thirigs. According to this tradition of piety, man lives ever on the
borderland of something more than the self. Even if the self lives
under an imperative of responsibility, it is not the overwhelming
responsibility of lifting itself by its own bootstraps. “Thought is
the hall-mark of man’s greatness.”21 But the tragedy of his
thought is its brokenness. It may well be that man needs the
conception of the Transcendent One to heal the brokenness.

lOOTNOTKS
IZen and the Art oj Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values
(New York; William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 73-74.

2/foirf.. D. 83.
^Ibid., p. 184.

‘^Ibid., pp. 228-29.
^Ibid., p. 237.
6See the “Author’s Note” at the beginning of the book.
"iZen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, p. 240.
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®The student of primitive thought, Laurens Van Der Post, for exam
ple, describes the feeling of primitive man in his relation to the uni
verse in the following manner:
[The] first man lived in an extraordinary intimacy with nature.
There was nowhere that he did not feel he belonged. He had none
of that dreadful sense of not belonging, of isolation, of meaning
lessness which so devastates the heart of modem man. Wherever
he went he felt that he belonged, and, what was more important,
where he went he felt that he was known. Wherever this little man
went he was known. The trees knew him; animals knew him as he
knew them; the stars knew him. His sense of relationship was so
vivid that he could speak of *^our brother the vulture. He looked
up at the stars and he spoke of “Grandmother Sirius” and of
“Grandfather Canis” because this was the highest title of honor
he could bestow. (Patterns of Renewal [Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle
Hill Pamphlet No. 121, undated], p- 8)^This phrase is from Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of
the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 1037.
10“Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour,” Collected Poems (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955, p. 524.
11“A Rabbit as King of the Ghosts,’’Co/Zecterf Poems, p. 209.
^^Selected Writings of Emerson (New York: Random House, Inc.,
1950), p. 169.
laSee Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People, pp. 1037-

54.
^^Philosophical Fragments (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962), p. 30.
\^The Responsible Self (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 90.
\(>lbid.. p. 123.
^^Ibid., p. 122.

j^lbid.. pp. 123-24.
l^Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday
Company, 1954), pp. 49 ff.
28Conrad Bonifazi, A Theology of Things (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1967), p. 25.
^iBlaise Pascal, Pascal’s Pensees, trans. Martin Tumell New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), p. 96.
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Margaret Hartman
VILLAINY: AN LXPOSR OF THE REAL VILLAIN
IN ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE

In this paper I wish to attack Pirsig and his account of Greek
philosophy. I think he plays dirty , and the victims of his attack,
Plato and Aristotle, are much too important and too worthy of
respect to receive such shoddy treatment. Pirsig makes a number
of inaccurate, undefended statements about the teachings of the
Greek philosophers. Let me be clear: I have nothing against
competent popularizers or innovative theorists; what I am against
are popularizers who either do not know their subject matter or
who recognize their interpretation is unusual but do not have the
gumption to defend it. Indeed, I give his work too much credit by
suggesting that it includes an interpretation of Plato and Aris
totle. An interpretation is based on texts. Pirsig mentions some
texts, but he seldom argues from the text, and what little he says
in direct response to texts is usually errant. The passage in Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance which I find most offensive
occurs on pages 352-353.1
Reason was to be subordinate, logically, to Quality, and he
was sure he would find the cause of its not being so back
among the ancient Greeks, whose mythos had endowed our
culture with the tendency underlying all the evils of our
technology, the tendency to do what is “reasonable” even
when it isn’t any good. That was the root of the whole
thing. Right there. I said a long time ago that he was in
pursuit of the ghost of reason. This is what 1 meant. Reason
and Quality had become separated and in conflict with each
other and Quality had heen forced under and reason made
supreme somewhaer back then.

I cannot imagine any circumstances under which either Plato or
Aristotle would endorse doing what is reasonable even when it
isn’t any good. Contrary to Pirsig’s contention Plato and Aris
totle emphasize the interrelation of reason and quality; and when
they indicate a superior partner in this relationship, both choose
goodness (quality). Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of Greek
thought.’’ (328)
Since I am not impressed with Pirsig’s account of Plato and
Aristotle and since reading his account makes me furious, I
intend to focus my attention in this paper on the works of Plato
and Aristotle. My paper should provide adequate textual refer
ences for the interested reader to delve into these texts more
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thoroughly. Then the reader will be in a position to make his or
her own judgment about the adequacies of Pirsig’s scholarship.
Since it is impossible to discuss all relevant material, I will
limit my discussion to three texts: Plato’s Republic and Philebus, and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.^
The early dialogues work to establish a connection between
reason and ethical behavior, but it is not until the Republic that
Plato directly confronts the question of the relationship between
reason and the Good. Plato presents his views through the
character Socrates^ who explains that an exposition of the nature
of the Good “seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my
flight today’’ (Republic 506de). Rather than trying to describe the
Good, Socrates presents three images which help illuminate its
nature. All three of these images, the Sun, the Line, and the
Cave, are attempts to impress upon us the existence of an intel
ligible world which is distinct from and superior to the world
grasped by the senses. The intelligible world is composed of
Forms, eternal and unchanging objects which are apprehended by
the mind without use of the senses. The Forms are also called
Ideas, but they are not creations of the mind. Actions and objects
in our everyday world depend on the forms for their existence:
actions can only be just if they participate in the eternal unchang
ing Form of Justice, and sensible chairs (chairs whose existence
is grasped by the senses) can only exist if they participate in
the eternal, unchanging Form of Chair. An eternal unchanging
Form of Justice is generally more acceptable to common sense
than an eternal unchanging form of Chair, but textual evidence
strongly suggests that Plato’s theory of Forms attempts to pro
vide stability for both ethics and physical reality.
7’his background information prepares the way for the Sun
analogy, the image in the middle dialogues where Plato most
explicitly articulates the relationship between the Good and
reason.
This (the sun), then, you must understand that I meant by
the offspring of the good which the good begot to stand in a
proportion with itself. As the good is in the intelligible
region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this (the
sun) in the visible world to vision and the objects of
visions. (Republic 508bc)4

In this passage Plato tells us that we can examine the role of
the sun in the visible world in order to increase our understanding
of the role of the Good in the intelligible world: thus, we can
examine the relationship between the sun and vision in order to
14

In The Visible World

In The Intelligible World

Sun
Presence

Good
Absence

Presence

Sight has
Sight has
clear vision dim vision
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR
VISION

DIM
VISION

Absence

Mind has clear Mind has dim
apprehension apprehension
of its objects of its objects
CLEAR
DIM
APPREHENSION APPREHENSION

presence of the sun which produces clear vision,
I
1* **
presence of the Good which produces clear intel
lectual apprehension. It is true that scholars debate about the
nature of this intellectual apprehension: some scholars maintain
that It IS mysucal apprehension while others declare that it is
knowled^ attained by reason. But however one chooses to trans
late the Greek words involved, it remains clear that apprehension
of the Good is the highest mental achievement. Furthermore, it is
clear that the Good itself is superior to the mental power which
apprehends it. At 509a Plato says:
But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration
it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to
think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider
these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform, but to think that either of them is the good is not
right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and
habit of the good.

In commenting on this passage Paul Shorey explains that Plato
is not scrupulous in distinguishing good and the good.^ Nonethe
less Plato’s lack of precision is not problematic because he
maintains that anyone who apprehends the Good will also do the
good. In any case, Glaucon responds to Socrates’ description
exactly as if Socrates had said “Still higher honor belongs to the
Form of the Good.’’ Such an interpretation of Plato’s statement
accords well with the analogy to the sun. Just as the sun is
superior to vision (the faculty which functions best in the
presence of the sun), so too the good is superior to the mental
function which performs cognition. Although Plato’s language is
not as clear as it might be, the Sun analogy provides strong
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evidence suggesting that Plato did not subordinate the Good to
rationality.
Reading the Sun analogy leaves one with little doubt that
Plato considered the Good superior to the mental function which
achieves knowledge and apprehension of the Good, but whatever
doubt remains is quickly dispelled by Plato’s introduction to the
Line, an image presented as a continuation of the Sun analogy.
Plato effects the transition to the Line by saying;
Conceive then, as we were saying, that there are these two
entities, and that one of them is soverign over the intel
ligible order and region and the other over the world of the
eye ball, not to say the sky-ball, but let that pass. You
surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intel
ligible. (Republic 509d)

Plato does not indicate the two identities to which he is referring
in this passage, but the Sun analogy has already made it clear
that the sun is the cause of things in the visible world and the
Good is the cause of things in the intelligible world. In this
passage Plato’s language emphasizes the superior role of these
two entities; the sun is soverign over the visible world and the
Good is soverign over the intelligible world. Surely then, the Sun
and the Line imagery suggest that Pirsig is wrong when he says
that Plato subordinates the Good to rationality.
I believe the material I have presented is adequate to show the
inadequacy of Pirsig’s comments regarding the relationship of
reason and the Good — at least in so far as his claims pertain to
Plato’s mi ddle dialogues. Before turning to Plato’s later period,
I will discuss the Line analogy and the Cave allegory. The Line
and the Cave images do complement and complete the Sun
analogy, but my major reason for presenting them is to establish
grounds for comparing the journey depicted by Plato’s Cave and
Pirsig’s journey. 7'his section digresses from the paper’s main
purpose, but the digression may provide useful tools for inter
preting Pirsig. I will begin by describing Plato’s Line, for it is
important to an adequate understanding of the Cave.
There is some scholarly debate concerning how the line
should be drawn, but 1 feel confident that it should be drawn as
a vertical line with its largest section at the top.6 Plato’s
directions for constructing the line specify that the line should
be divided unevenly, and then that each of the two sections
formed should be divided in the same proportion as the first
division. The line which emerges is a 4 section line, the sections
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being in the proportion 4:2;2:1. The top two sections represent
the intelligible world, and the bottom two sections represent the
visible world. The bottom two sections are most easy to explain:
The bottommost section represents shadows and images of things
in the sensible-world (e.g. a shadow of a tree), and the section
immediately above represents the sensible things themselves
(e.b. the tree).^ The top two sections of the line are distinguished
in terms of the methods used to investigate intelligible objects.
The bottom section of the intelligible world represents objects
which are investigated by the method of hypothesis and the
investigation involves use of sensible images. The objects
represented by the top section of the line are investigated by
dialectic and no sensible imagery is involved. The following
diagram should help put the parts of the line in perspective.
objects investigated
(1) by dialectic
(2) without use of sensible imagery

/
intelligible
world

2

sensible
world

3

objects investigated
(1) by the method of hypothesis
(2) using sensible images

sensible objects
plants, animals, artifacts

shadows and images of things in section 3

The Divided Line is presented at the end of Book VI of the
Republic, and full appreciation of it depends upon a reading of
the end of Book V and the earlier parts of Book VI. These sec
tions of the Republic distinguish the philosophical from the nonphilosophical life. Plato contends that those who spend their
lives emphasizing the pleasures of the sensible world are mere
lovers of spectables — spending their time on what is changing
and unstable. More worthy is the philosophical life where one
seeks the eternal unchanging world of the Forms. The Divided
Line represents different grades of reality; progress up the line
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represents progress from the shadow world of the senses (for the
sensible world is but a shadow of the intelligible world) to the
intelligible world.
The Divided Line presents the different levels of reality, but
it is the Cave allegory that discusses movement between levels.
A subterranean cave symbolizes the sensible world, and the
world outside the cave symbolizes the intelligible world. Plato
first describes the region inside the cave. In the center of the
cave there is a fire. Around the edges of the cave are prisoners,
all chained in such a way that their backs are to the fire and they
can only look at the cave wall in front of them. Between the
prisoner and the fire is a wall. Lxtending above this wall are
puppets, the shadows of which are cast on the cave wall by the
fire. Given this physical set up the prisoners are only able to
view the shadows of the puppets on the cave wall. These
shadows clearly represent a very low degree of reality. Plato
now describes the job of trying to raise these prisoners to see
higher degrees of reality. The prisoners begin viewing shadows
on the cave wall. As the prisoners are exposed to increasing
degrees of reality they view the puppets which create the shadows
and then the fire in the cave. At this point the prisoners are
of the cave where they initially see shadows of
sensible objects, then sensible objects themselves, and finally
they reach the high point of their journey, vision of the sun. The
various stages in the Cave allegory symbolize the stages repre
sented by the Divided Line. The following chart presents the
symbols and antitypes in the Cave and Line.

CAVE ALLEGORY

LINE ANALOGY

(symbol)

(antitype)

Sun

Good

sensible objects
viewed directly

intelligible objects
apprehended by dialectic

shadows of
sensible objects

intelligible objects investigated
by method of hypothesis

Fire

Sun

puppets

sensible objects viewed
directly

shadows of puppets
on cave wall

shadows of
sensible objects
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Thus the release of the prisoners represents
the lowest level of the sensible world up into the^’

t ™
U

world and finally to a vision of the Good. If one
£ .u r J
• f 1
u i
L
achieves vision
of the Good, one is truly a philosopher. But now the rub The
philosopher who has attained vision of the Good is not permitted
to enjoy eternal bliss contemplating it; he or she must return to
the cave in order to try to rescue others. Thus the cave allegory
has two phases: the rise up out of the subterranean cave and the
return down into the cave.8 The following diagrams present the
journey depicted by the Cave and the intellectual journey the
Cave symbolizes.
The Journey Depicted
by the Cave

The Intellectual Journey Corresponding
to the Cave

Vision
of the
Sun

Vision
of the
Good

return
to
the
cave

return
to the
sensible
world

Although I do not wish to develop the comparison in great
detail, I suggest that there are definite similarities between
Plato’s Cave allegory and Pirsig’s journey across country.
Pirsig’s journey takes him from the plains up to the top of the
mountain and down to the sea. The geographical structure of
Pirsig’s trip coordinates with the structure of Phaedrus’ journey.
Phaedrus’ journey begins by examining concrete instances of
quality in rhetoric classes and then moves into a purely intellec
tual journey. On page 269 Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ intellectual
journey.
But to understand the meaning of Quality in classic terms
required a backup into metaphysics and its relation to
everyday life. To do that required still another backup into
the huge area that relates both metaphysics and everyday
life — namely, formal reason. So I proceeded with formal
reason up into metaphysics and then into Quality and then
from Quality back down into metaphysics and science.

The

following diagrams depicting Pirsig’s and Phaedrus’
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journeys should be compared to the diagrams depicting Plato’s
Lave allegory.
Pirsig's Journey
Across Country

Phaedrus' Journey

Mountaintop

Quality

seaside

\
\bottom of
\ the sea
The fact that the downsides of the arches are not identical is not
problematic for Pirsig completes a journey wbicb Phaedrus does
not. Phaedrus does not return to a life filled with concrete
instances of quality but ends up in a mental hospital. At the end
of the book Pirsig achieves a quality relationship with his son
that Phaedrus had not achieved. Perhaps that is one reason that
Pirsig says that he will meet Chris at “the bottom of the ocean’’
(pages 267 and 400) rather than at the oceanside: in so far as the
cross-country journey is inadequate to symbolize what Pirsig
achieved that Phaedrus did not.
I intend to undertake a brief comparison of Plato’s Cave and
Phaedrus’ journey, but do not expect Plato’s Cave to provide a
complete explanation of Pirsig’s symbolism. 4'he facts that
Pirsig is very concerned with his own mental states and that he
associates the ocean with “the deepest levels of subconscious
ness’’ (397) suggest that psychological as well as philosophical
tools are needed for complete interpretation. I am not in a posi
tion to supply the appropriate psychological tools, but I hope
that access to Plato’s Cave will provide relevant philosophical
background for understanding at least part of what the book is
about.
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The four diagrams I have presented, two arches depicting the
journeys related to the Cave and two arches depicting the jour
neys in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, provide the
basis for my comparison. I have already presented the passage
in which Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ journey in terms of a way
up and a way down. Pirsig’s language is extremely similar to the
language Plato uses in describing the path to apprehension of
the Good. Plato’s description appears in the Divided Line
analogy, but the Line is the prelude to the Cave.
Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the
intelligible (the top section of the line) 1 mean that which
the reason {ho logos) itself lays hold of by the power of
dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute begin
nings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings,
and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that
which required no assumption and is the starting point of
all, and after attaining to that taking hold of the first
dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the con
clusion . . ..(Republic 511bc)

Pirsig might well balk at Plato’s description of dialectic as the
method which enables one to rise to the starting point of all, but
the method Plato describes is not at odds with Pirsig’s general
approach. Shorey translates ho logos as reason in this passage,
but some scholars interpret dialectic as mental or mystical
vision. Plato uses two different words to describe the mental
state corresponding to the top section of the line. At 511e he
calls that mental state noesis which suggests some sort of
immediate apprehension, but at 534a he refers to the same state
as episteme which suggests that it is knowledge attained by
reason. Pirsig may refuse a mystical interpretation of Plato or he
may not even be aware that such interpretations exist, but even
if he insists that dialectic is reason, the similarity of his own
approach to Plato’s is still evident.
From what 1 have said it should be apparent that there is a
great deal of similarity between Plato s Good and Phaedrus
Quality. In fact, at one point Pirsig says that he would have con
sidered them the same except for the fact that Phaedrus vehe
mently denied it (361). Pirsig later explains how Plato went
wrong:
Plato hadn't tried to destroy arete. He had encapsulated it;
made a permanent, fixed idea out of it; had converted it to a
rigid, immobile Immortal Truth. He made arete the Good, the
highest Idea of all. It was subordinate only to Truth itself,
in a synthesis of all that had gone before. (373)
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Perhaps this passage gets at the heart of Phaedrus’ problems
with Plato. Pirsig does not seem to understand the nature of the
horms. I he Forms are not truths, but objects which make truth
possible. Just as one must not confuse vision or color with the
cause of vision and color, so too one must not confuse knowledge
or truth with the cause of knowledge and truth. If Pirsig were to
realize that Plato subordinates truth to Goodness he would find
further similarity between their views. I suspect that the real
issue between Plato and Pirsig is the absolute versus the
relative nature of the Good, but I don’t find that Pirsig has
addressed that question in any substantial way. I find the idea of
mystical apprehension of a relative nature somewhat baffling,
but I will not pursue that point since Pirsig avoids the issue.
There is one further similarity between Plato’s and Pirsig’s
journeys whihc merits consideration. The second half of Zen and
the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is quite concerned with where
Pirsig will meet Chris. At first one expects Pirsig to meet Chris
at the top of the mountain. On page 222 Chris tells Pirsig about
the previous night:
You said at the top of the mountain we’d see everything.
You said you were going to meet me there.

Pirsig does recall Phaedrus’ mystical apprehension of Quality
at the top of the mountain, but he does not meet Chris there.
These facts make sense when interpreted in light of Plato’s
Cave. Phaedrus’ apprehension of Quality which takes place at
the top of the mountain is quite like Plato’s apprehension of the
Good. And just as Plato’s philosopher cannot meet those who
have not made the journey into the intelligible realm while
contemplating the Good, so too it makes sense that Pirsig cannot
meet Chris at the top of the mountain. Chris has not shared
Pirsig’s intellectual journey: if Pirsig wishes to meet Chris, he
must return to the everyday world. Both the philosopher and
Pirsig must travel their respective “downward paths’’ before they
can adequately communicate with those who have not journeyed
through the intelligible realm.
From this digression let us now return to the focus of this
paper, the relationship between reason and the Good in the texts
of Plato and Aristotle. Earlier I presented the Sun analogy as
Plato’s clearest account of the relationship between reason and
the Good in his middle dialogues. I suspect that Pirsig is not
familiar with the later dialogue I now intend to discuss, the
Philebus, but since Plato’s dialogue, Phaedrus, is a transitional
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dialogue to Plato’s later period, I believe discussion of the
Philebus is relevant. I do not wish to discuss the differences
between middle and late Platonic dialogues in great detail, but 1
do think it is significant to point out that the late dialogues
involve a new (or if not new a greatly elaborated) account of the
nature of dialectic. I have already presented Plato’s account of
dialectic in the Republic: it is the method by which one rises to
first principles. In the Phaedrus Plato characterizes dialectic as
the procedures of collection and division:
Phaedrus: What procedures do you mean?
Socrates:

The first is that in which we bring a dispensed
plurality under a single form, seeing it all
together — the purpose being to define so-and-so,
and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen
as the topic for exposition . . .

Phaedrus; And what is the second procedure you speak of,
Socrates?
Socrates:

The reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled
to divide into forms, following the objective
articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off
parts like a clumsy butcher . . ..{Phaedrus 265de)

The dialectician can identify what multiplicities share a single
nature and thus unite them under one form, and he or she can
also begin with one form and divide it into natural parts. The
fact that Pirsig’s former self was so concerned with the pro
cedures of collection and division helps explain why Pirsig
refers to his former self as Phaedrus. Perhaps then Pirsig
believes the later dialogues are where Plato subordinates the
Good to reason. If that is what he wishes to contend, he owes
us an account of the Philebus.
Ethical concerns play a major role in almost all of Plato’s
early and middle dialogues, but not in many later dialogues. The
Philebus, however, picks up earlier ethical concerns, particularly
those expressed in the Protagoras and Republic, and it provides
Plato’s final answer to the question: is pleasure or reason closer
to the good? I trust I will not spoil the dialogue for those of you
who have not read it by affirming what you already suspect:
Plato believes reason is closer to the good than pleasure. He
reaches this conclusion by hunting down the nature of the good.
Socrates:

So now we find that the good has taken refuge
in the character of the beautiful, for the qualities
of measure and proportion invariably, 1 imagine.
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constitute beauty and excellence.
Protarchus:
Socrat es:
Protarchus:
Socrates:

Yes indeed.
And of course we said that truth was included
along with these qualities in the mixture.
Quite so.
Then if we cannot hunt down the good under a
single form, let us secure it by the conjunction
of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, and then,
regarding these three as one, let us assert that
that may most properly be held to determine the
qualities of the mixture, and because that is
good the mixture itself has become so.
(Philehus 64e-65a)

Socrates then demonstrates that of the two, pleasure and reason,
reason is closer to the good for it is closer to truth, proportion
and beauty. Socrates ends by ranking things which contribute to
a good life: (1) what possesses measure, (2) what is proportioned
and beautiful, (3) reason and intelligence, (4) sciences, arts, and
right opinions, and (5) pure pleasures of the soul, i.e. pleasures
which do not also bring pain (Philehus 66abc). In light of this
text I find it hard to see that Plato subordinated tbe good to
reason.
At the beginning of this paper I said that Pirsig plays dirty.
One reason I say that is that his book presents passages which
suggest that he knows at least some of his statements are
inaccurate. For example, at one point while discussing Aristotle,
he says:
I have since read Aristotle again, looking for the massive
evil that appears in the fragments from Phaedrus, but have
not found it there. What 1 find in Aristotle is mainly a quite
dull collection of generalizations, many of which seem
impossible to justify in the light of modern knowledge,
whose organization appears extremely poor, and which seems
primitive in the way old Greek pottery in the museums seems
primitive. I’m sure if I knew a lot more about it I would see
a lot more and not find it primitive at all. But without know
ing all that I can’t see that it lives up either to the raves of
the Great Books group or the rages of Phaedrus. I certainly
don’t see Aristotle’s works as a major source of either
positive or negative values. But the raves of the great
Books groups are well known and published. Phaedrus’
rages aren’t, and it becomes part of my obligation to dwell
on these, (p. 353)

From this it appears that Pirsig does not believe that he can
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defend Phaedrus’ statements about Aristotle (and 1 suspect the
same applies to Plato) on the basis of texts. But if Pirsig is
unwilling to take responsibility for the accuracy of Phaedrus’
statements, on what ground can he find an obligation to dwell on
“rages”? 1 suspect that the raves of the Great Books groups are
known by a narrower audience than Pirsig’s book has reached.
The end result is that competent scholars dismiss his work as
ignorant undefended rages and the general public comes away
with a terribly misguided impression of Plato and Aristotle.
Competent scholars may well be at fault for not conveying their
understandings to a wider audience, but on the scale of sins I
find Pirsig’s slander more offensive.
Before turning to Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship
between the good and reason, it seems appropriate to mention
that Pirsig is as ignorant of the pre-Socratic philosophers (whom
Pirsig refers to as cosmologists) and the sophists as he is of
Plato and Aristotle. It is true that most pre-Socratic philosophers
were particularly interested in cosmology, but it is equally true
that some of the pre-Socratic philosophers were interested in
ethics. Thus 1 find fault with Phaedrus’ search which Pirsig
describes on page 373, “Phaedrus searched, but could find no
previous cosmologists who had talked about the Good. Since he
goes on to say that the sophists talked about the Good, he must
not mean Plato’s Good; rather, he must mean the good life. But
clearly some of the pre-Socratics were concerned about the good
life. In different ways the good life is important to Heraclitus,
the Pythagoreans, and Democritus. Consider, for example, the
fragment from Democritus:
The man who chooses the good of the soul makes a more
divine choice; he who chooses the good of the body makes
a mortal choice.9

This fragment makes it clear that Democritus was concerned
about the good life; other fragments discuss in more detail how
the good life is achieved.
Pirsig’s treatment of the sophists is also distressing. He
suggests, that it is the sophists who are most concerned about
arete, i.e. excellence. But Pirsig has very little understanding of
the arete the sophists discuss. On page 371 lightning hits
Phaedrus;
Quality! Virtue! Dharma! That is what the Sophists were
teaching! Not ethical relativism. Not pristine “virtue.” But
arete. Excellence. Dharma! Before the Church of Reason.
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Before substance. Before form. Before mind and matter.
Before dialectic itself. Quality had been absolute. Those
first teachers of the Western world were teaching Quality,
and the medium they had chosen was that of rhetoric. He
had been doing it right all along.

Lightning may have struck Phaedrus, but it’s too bad it didn’t
bring illumination. I find no evidence in Pirsig’s text that the
arete of the sophists is Phaedrus’ Quality. Indeed, my suspicion
is that neither Pirsig nor Phaedrus have much understanding of
the sophists view of arete. Pirsig mentions Protagoras’ view that
man is the measure of all things, but the connection between that
doctrine and Phaedrus’ Quality is very unclear. I suspect Pirsig
would be surprised to learn that the arete Protagoras tried to
teach was the ability to become a power in the city-state and the
arete Gorgias tried to teach was the ability to help one’s friends
and harm one’s enemies. “Arete” does mean excellence in
Greek, but early Greek notions of what constitutes human excel
lence are quite different from ours.^® Indeed, Socrates’ great
contribution was to connect arete and reason: rather than separat
ing quality and reason as Pirsig contends, the Greek philosophers
(Socrates, Plato and Aristotle particularly) connected them in
ways that had not been done previously.
I have already shown that Plato considered the Good and
reason interdependent and that he considered reason subordinate
to the Good. I will not discuss Aristotle in as great detail, but I
will discuss the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics which
explain the role of the good in Aristotle’s philosophy. Before
doing that I would like to make two less important points: both
emerge in response to Phaedrus’ attack on Aristotle’s treatment
of rhetoric. Phaedrus complains:
As a branch of Practical Science it (rhetoric) was isolated
from any concern with Truth or Good or Beauty, except as
devices to throw into an argument. Thur Quality, in Aris
totle’s system, is totally divorced from rhetoric. This con
tempt for thetoric, combined with Aristotle’s own atrocious
quality of rhetoric, so completely alienated Phaedrus he
couldn’t read anything Aristotle said without seeking ways
to despise it and attack it. (p. 3.58)

F'irst, Pirsig does not seem to know that Aristotle did not prepare
the texts of his work which we now have. Aristotle’s exoteric
works (the works written for distribution outside his school) are
all lost. What we have now are texts compiled from the notes of
Aristotle’s students. God forbid that the quality of my rhetoric
ever be judged on the compilation of my students’ notes. Second,
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Pirsig must not understand Aristotle’s distinction between
Theoretical and Practical Science. In his Introduction to Aristotle
Richard McKeon, a highly respected scholar, distinguishes the
ends of Aristotle s theoretical and practical sciences:
The end of the theoretic sciences is knowledge, and the
subject matters which are investigated and the truths which
are sought in them do not depeod on our action or our
volition. The end of the practical sciences, on the other
hand, is not merely to know, but rather to act in the light of
knowledge; it is not the purpose of political science, for
example, to know the good, but to make men good. (p. xxi)

At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle emphasizes
that ethics is a practical science: its purpose is not merely to
understand the nature of the good but to make humans good. If
Pirsig understood Aristotle’s distinction, he would certainly
approve Aristotle’s placing rhetoric in the practical sciences.
Practical sciences are very much concerned with Truth, Beauty,
and Goodness.
It is now time to examine Aristotle’s understanding of the
relationship between reason and the good. The Nicomachean
Ethics opens with the assertion:
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action, is
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things
aim. (1094a 1-4)

Aristotle then goes on to explain that different activities aim at
different ends, and that the final end which we seek by pursuing
diverse intermediate ends is the chief good. Thus Aristotle con
tends that all our activity, intellectual and otherwise, is subordi
nate in a certain sense to the good; whatever we do we do for
the sake of the good.
Aristotle explains that it is generally agreed that the chief
good which all humans seek is happiness, but that it is not gen
erally agreed wherein happiness lies. Different Greeks argued
that happiness consists in wealth or honor or pleasure, but
Aristotle’s contribution lies in his attempt to argue that the
highest happiness consists in reasoning and, in particular,
philosophic contemplation. The whole thrust of the Nicomachean
Ethics develops out of Aristotle’s contention that the function of
man is activity guided by reason and that the good and happy man
who performs his function well.
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Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which
follows or implies a rational principle, ... and we state
the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to
be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational
principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and
noble performance of these, and if any action is well per
formed when it is performed in accordance with the appropri
ate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to
be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there
are more than one virtue in accordance with the best and
most complete. (1098a)

To this basic account of the human good Aristotle adds the
further conditions that the human good includes virtuous activity
throughout a complete life (1098a) and that the happy life requires
a certain amount of external goods (1099a). When I discuss
Aristotle’s view of human good, I will speak only of its main
thrust, that human good (or happiness) is activity of the soul in
accordance with virtue, but the reader should keep in mind that
this form is abbreviated.
The statement, “Human good is activity of the soul in accord
ance with virtue,’’ may not strike anyone as tremendously insight
ful, but I believe it becomes more significant as one sees what
Aristotle is getting at. The Greek word for virtue is “arete” and
arete is better translated “excellence.” Thus, human good is
activity of the soul in accordance with excellence. The excell
ence of the soul depends on the soul’s function. As the passage
at 1098a makes clear, Aristotle believes that the function of the
human soul is activity which implies a rational principle. The
human soul performs its function best when it manifests two
kinds of activity involving rational principles: intellectual
activity and moral activity. When a soul reasons well and acquires
truth, it possesses intellectual excellence. When truth is applied
to action and a human uses reason to control his or her desires,
excellence is present.!!
From my brief remarks about Aristotle’s ethics, I believe the
relationship between the good and reason is apparent. The good
is the final end of all human activity. Humans agree that the final
end at which they aim is happiness. Aristotle contends that the
highest happiness is produced by intellectual and moral virtue.
These virtues or excellences of the soul are present in a soul
which performs its function well, i.e. a soul which reasons well.
Thus, according to Aristotle, the greatest good and reason are
interdependent. The good is higher than reason, however, for we
reason for the sake of the good.
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Far from separating reason and the good both Plato and
Aristotle argue for their interdependence, and far from subordinat
ing the good to reason both Plato and Aristotle subordinate
reason to the good. Sarah is right: “Quality is every part of
Greek life.” But reason is also an important pemt of Greek life.
Plato and Aristotle gave different accounts of the relationship of
reason and the good, and yet both are convinced that the soul
which embraces reason will live a happier and better life than
the soul which rejects reason. Pirsig seems to be suggesting
that in order to reach the highest good, he has to reject reason or
to expand its normal domain. He seems to be suggesting that by
moving into insanity he approaches a higher goal than reason
permits. But look at the quality of his life prior to his being
institutionalized. If that is the life which goind beyond the
bounds of reason produces, I prefer not to be insane. I see no
evidence whatsoever that insanity produces quality.
That is not to say, however, as Plato and Aristotle did not
say, that reason and quality are identical. I believe Plato and
Aristotle had it just right: reason and the good are interrelated,
and reason helps to produce a quality life. Pirsig seems to
believe that he has to leave the Western tradition in order to
gain insight into how to achieve peace of mind. It is a shame
that his understanding of the Greeks is so shabby for Greek
philosophy would take him a long way in the direction he wishes
to go. Aristotle tells us that eudaimonia (happiness or well-being
of the spirit) occurs when humans function well — particularly
when they reason well since rational activity is the particular
function of man. I suggest that Pirsig owes a debt to Aristotle
when he says:
The study of the art of motorcycle maintenance is really a
miniature study of the art of rationality itself. Working on a
motorcycle, working well, caring, is ... to achieve an inner
peace of mind.l^

In order to work well at maintaining a motorcycle one must
function according to rational principles. Humans who function in
accordance with rational principles will function well. As a
result they will achieve peace of mind, eudaimonia.
Perhaps what makes me maddest about Pirsig’s book is that
everything I find in it of value, I find the roots for in Greek
philosophy — and yet Pirsig has the gall to characterize Plato
and Aristotle as villains ultimately responsible for the lack of
care associated with modern technology. I hope this paper has
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demonstrated that Pirsig gives the Greek philosophers a bad rap.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle would ever advocate doing what is
reasonable even when it isn’t any good. That wouldn’t make any
sense to them. Reason is a capacity of mind whose function is
to promote the good. For Plato reason is either (1) what appre
hends the Good or (2) what enables one to reach a further mental
state which apprehends the Good. Then reason is used to help
create quality in everyday life. For Aristotle reason is that which
most effectively helps us attain the ends which we seek. Plato
and Aristotle did not subordinate the good to reason; rather, they
were among the first who pointed out the important role of reason
in creating quality lives. If there is a villain in Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance (and I think that there is), he is not
Plato or Aristotle. He is the slanderer.

INFORMAL FOOTNOTES
All references from Pirsig are from Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the
Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (New York;
Bantam Books, 1976). Page numbers appear in the text of the paper
throughout.
All references from Plato are from TAe Collected Dialogues of Plato
edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 1961. The Aristotle
references appear in Introduction to Aristotle edited by Richard
McKeon, 1947.
'’• Scholars divide Plato’s work into early, middle, and late dialogues.
Socrates is the main character in the early and middle dialogues,
but the early dialogues are thought to reflect his views whereas the
middle dialogues are thought to present Plato’s views. In the late
dialogues Socrates is sometimes the main character, sometimes a
minor character, and sometimes he does not appear at all. The
Republic is a middle dialogue, and the Philebus is a late dialogue.
References to Plato and Aristotle will be given via Stephanus
numbers, the numbers which occur along the margins of most
editions. Stephanus numbers refer to early manuscripts, and their
use makes it easier to compare translations.
See Paul Shorey’s footnote in the Loeb edition of the Republic,
1963, page 105. Many of you may be unfamiliar with the Loebs; they
arc put out by Harvard University Press, and they present the Greek
text on one page and an English translation on the opposite page.
The line should be drawn vertically because of its connection to the
Cave where up and down are important. The top section should be
largest because the top represents the greatest degree of reality.
Plato initially says that the bottom portion of the line represents the
visible world. The visible world is eventually broadened in the Cave
allegory to include all the sensible world.
My description of the Cave is but a poor shadow of the original. I
encourage everyone to read Plato’s Sun, Line and Cave images at
Republic 506b-520e. The passage is really quite short and well
worth your time.
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9- See John Mansley Robinson. Av Introduction to Early Greek Philo
sophy, 1968, page 229.
1*^- Greek notions of arete have been discussed in detail by Professor
A. W. H. Adkins — Professor of Classics and Philosophy at the
University of Chicago. He presents a valuable brief account of his
findings in Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece.
Book 1 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics provides a general intro
duction. Books II-V characterize moral virtue, and Book VI discusses
intellectual virtue. Book Vll Discusses pleasure, and Books Vlll
and IX analyze friendship. Book X brings the Ethics to a culmina
tion with a final account of the good life. Those of you who wish to
explore Aristotle’s Ethics can get an overview by reading Books I,
11, VI, and X.
12. Pirsig’s prefatory remark presented inside the front cover.
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William T. Hamilton
TAKING PLEASURE WHERE YOU FIND IT

Why are you reading this? Why, for that matter, are you attend
ing this seminar, when you could be playing handball, sleeping
late, or, like Good King Wenceslas, gathering winter fu-el?
Probably one of your motives is a sense of duty, that virtue
so dear to the puritan west, of deferring pleasure until the Just
Reward, which comes precious because it comes late. Attending
these seminars is an officially sanctioned and therefore unques
tionably responsible use of the Intertefm and hence a useful thing
to put in the blank on the Faculty Annual Report which asks you
to account for your educational use of this period, which the
Otterbein establishment insists is not to be considered a vaca
tion. And, since most of you are now professors, you were
probably good students in school and college, and, as we all
know, good students always read their assignments. Your sense
of duty no doubt goes a long way towards answering the simpleminded questions I began with.
I hope, however, that it doesn’t account entirely for your
presence in the seminar, nor for your having read this far into
this paper. I think that some part of the motivation is a hope,
probably slight and diminishing by now, for “quality.” Maybe,
just maybe, there might be something good down the line, if not
on this page, perhaps on the next — a joke, an insight, something
that would make one or two moments of reading distinguish them
selves by their quality from other moments.
In the course of his attempt to define — or rather describe —
the undefinable, Robert M. Pirsig associates “quality” with a
number of concepts and intuitions. The one that interests me the
most as a potential insight into the problems of teaching writing,
however, is his association of quality with pleasure (see particu
larly Chapter 19). “Pleasure” in turn he defines with a disarming
simplicity: “what you like.” Stated that way, the concept of
quality seems trivial, especially when you consider the vast
array of things we think are wrong with the way our students
express themselves on paper. Think of the dangers that face the
professor who announces to his class that the papers he likes
best are going to get the A’s and B’s, while the penalty for dis
pleasing him on paper is going to be a D or F. What if a student
claims that her D paper gave her (and, to make it even more
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perilous, let us say her roommate as well) a great deal of pleas
ure, and the teacher’s dislike of it is simply a reflection of his
own eccentric tastes? What possible defense does the teacher
have against the student’s charge that he is relying on purely
subjective criteria?
It is my current opinion (which means that I may be ready to
change it at any moment under the right kind of challenge) that
our only chance of solving the “Writing Problem” is to restore to
the process of writing and to the teaching of writing this sense
of quality-as-pleasure. I am further convinced that this is not a
task that English teachers alone can hope to accomplish, that,
for reasons I hope to establish, we are all teachers of writing,
whether we teach English or nursing or philosophy. To meet this
challenge, we need to come up with a convincing escape from the
subjectivity trap, or, to put it differently, we need to find ways
of pulling our students into the trap with us. One of the best
things about Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is that
Pirsig suggests some ways of pulling it off: ways of resolving
the apparent difficulties of confessing to our own subjectivity,
ways of involving the students as writers in events that are
characterized by quality-as-pleasure, and finally specific ways
of teaching quality when we teach writing. To follow Pirsig’s
terms, we need to find ways of persuading the student to engage
in a “caring” relationship with his work (see Chapter 24).
Let us begin this task with a touch of quality. The following
sentence, extracted from a freshman theme written at the Univer
sity of Washington twenty years ago, was proudly displayed on
the bulletin board in the English office:
“The main difference between Christians and atheists
is that Christians believe in the Afterbirth.”
(If you didn’t find that funny, please read the sentence again. If
you still don’t find it funny, I think I’ve lost you. Seek quality
elsewhere, and let me know where you find it.)
With those of you who are still with me, I want to assume that
this is a perfectly marvelous sentence, absolutely brilliant or
perfectly inept depending on its context. I think it has three
possible contexts, each readily distinguishable from the others
in terms of quality:

Context 1:
As it stood, on the UW bulletin board. Here, the readers —
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mostly English teachers or advanced English students - got
considerable pleasure from watching this student slip on his
verbal banana peel and from participating vicariously in the
delight of the freshman composition instructor who mined this
gem from the barren waste that usually results from assigning
this sort of topic to a group of freshmen (“Compare and contrast
Christians and Atheists, Russia and the United States, High
School and College, or Up and Down. 500 wds. minimum”). For
our purposes, this is the least interesting of the possible con
texts: there is probably no way we can improve the quality of our
lives by asking each of our students to make at least one enter
taining rreudian slip during the term.

Context 2:
In an essay in which the student deliberately plays with the
words afterlife and afterbirth. In this context, the reader shares
the writer’s sense of play, his sense of the infinitely varied
possibilities of our shared language. We’ve only got one sentence
here, but if this hypothetical student keeps this up, reading his
paper, with its associations of the heavenly mysteries and barn
yard realities, is going to be the highpoint of our evening of
paper grading. We are going to share this writer’s pleasure in
language.

Context 3:
Almost certainly the real one — the context of a theme by a
miserably inattentive student who has no understanding of what
he’s writing about and little confidence in his ability to choose
words. The momentary pleasure of finding the slip soon gives
way to despair: what can I do with a student who knows so little
about his subject or his language that he falls into such an
error? It’s like listening to a piano student who never practices,
or watching a mechanically inept professor assemble a rotisserie:
no pleasure here, only pain.
We evaluate the sentence differently depending on the context
in which it appears, that context depending largely upon the
intentions of the writer who presents the statement to us. We
evaluate it, of course, for its quality (that seems to be a neces
sary tautology as I try to work out what’s going on here), and
that quality is a matter of the pleasure or displeasure we take.
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I’ve been relying heavily on the pronoun we in the last few
paragraphs. 1 need now to defend that pronoun: it’s my main
defense against the student’s charge that my grading standards
are unfairly subjective. Let me, a, la Pirsig, resort to a bit of
autobiography. 1 am confident in using the pronoun ^ we in my
evaluation of the sentence because I ve shared the afterbirth
anecdote with dozens of people since I first saw the sentence
twenty years ago. A very few people didn t get it or thought it
was disgusting. Most have reacted to it with pleasure. I belong,
I discover, to a language community which shares my evaluation
of this utterance. I’m writing (I think) to a part of that community
now. If my evaluation is subjective, it is certainly shared by a
lot of people. We can’t point to the objective standards of quality
by which we evaluate it, but neither can we still believe that our
evaluation is eccentric, since it seems to be widely shared.
Perhaps our standards are intersubjective, a term I kept expecting
Pirsig to use, especially in Chapter 19, where he convincingly
(to me, at any rate) demonstrates that quality is neither objective
nor subjective. Our standards are intersubjective in the sense
that they derive from our belonging to a community which, in a
broad way, seems to agree about them. I think Pirsig is right in
maintaining that to call our love or admiration for Beethoven,
Tolstoy or Picasso purely subjective (and therefore somehow
unreal) in simply silly.
Assuming that we can now safely say to a class of writing
students that we are going to evaluate their work on the basis of
the pleasure we take in reading it, how do we get our students
involved in this pleasure-seeking community? I think Pirsig is
highly instructive here, not only in his specific classroom experi
ment, flawed as he admits it was, but also in the general approach
his book takes to establishing the character of quality. I think
one of the ways of analyzing the writing problem is along the
lines of the classical/romantic split Pirsig identifies. Let me
return to the student who insists that she and her roommate both
thought the paper I gave her a D on was pretty good. (This, I’m
sure you all realize, is hardly a hypothetical case.) I have found
that such defenses are seldom coherent. The student can point to
a sentence or two which she thinks constitutes the central idea
of the paper; she can, if pressed, find a few details or facts that
might be construed as supporting that idea, and she may be able
to prove that she read the assignment on which the paper was
based. But the defense is almost certainly one that relies on the
surfaces of the paper and the thought that went into it. She
thought that Sons and Lovers was about premarital sex, she’s
against premarital sex, and here — right here — is where she
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said so.
What our student cannot do is identify underlying form in the
paper. She can’t point to where she chose one word because it
belongs to the same kind of analysis or structure of feeling as
these other words she chose. She cannot show how she prepared
the ground for her freshest insight, or attached one sentence or
paragraph to another with skillful transitions. There was no
strategy, no technique, to the writing decisions she made. And
further conversation with her is likely to reveal that a major part
of her resentment at the low grade is based on her sense that I
take a technological approach to her writing, and she doesn t
understand the technology. She’s in the same position as the
professor trying to put together the rotisserie — she’s cut her
thumb on the blasted thing, though she tried to follow the
directions.
She’s right. The problem is a technological one, and I know
the technology. I take pleasure in writing (when it’s going well)
because I know how to do it; or, I know how to do it because I
take pleasure in it. To apply Pirsig’s terms to the phenomenon,
I can experience quality events in my writing because I know how
to care about the process. Events and caring are active phenom
ena: I’ve learned how to please myself. (Not always, of course; I
can sympathize with writing students because I often face the
intractible: the writing problem where my capabilities in the
technology seem to be inadequate. As Pirsig suggests, this is
the time to drink coffee, take a nap, or, if it’s really intractible,
go fishing.) What I hope to come up with is an essay or a poem;
because I understand something about the underlying form, I know
what to do, how to perform, to loosen the screw or mend the
sentence.
It follows, I think, that instruction in writing must be instruc
tion in caring. We must help the student to perform competently,
but that means that we must design the instruction so that he
experiences quality events in his writing. Most of our students
are skillful in something: playing the tuba, kicking a football,
arranging a bouquet. One way to begin may be to ask them to
examine the underlying form of such skills. We take pleasure from
what we do well, but if we look back at the processes by which
we became competent at those things, I think we can identify
stages at which we had to work very hard and experienced
considerable discomfort because we didn’t understand the moves.
As we become more accomplished, we are able to care: we can
refine our skills, attend to more parts of our performance, develop

not only competence, but style and flair.
I think the writing problem most of our students have is the
result of the fact that they have had very few pleasurable experi
ences in their use of language. At least they seem to have had
few such experiences with adults outside of the family. To con
verse with a freshman, at least on first acquaintance, is to be
sprayed with a shower of “likes” and “reallys,” “you knows”
and “he goes.” To read his paper is an even more painful
experience: even if he can spell and punctuate with some sense
of the conventions, he writes as if he were walking through a
minefield, conscious that each step may be his last, that his
teacher may at any moment find the fatal comma fault, lack of
agreement, misplaced modifier, or unsubstantiated generalization.
Again, no pleasure, only pain. You can’t care in a minefield, only
worry, and they’re not the same thing. You can only fear a tech> nology you see little hope of mastering.
The first thing we have to do is to clear that minefield. If the
student perceives (and he usually does) that his teacher is watch
ing mainly for errors, not successes, his writing strategy is going
to be the negative one of trying to avoid errors. Again, this is
anxiety, not caring. I don’t mean we should stop marking errors:
for one thing, I couldn’t stop myself from marking them. I have
little control of my red pen when I see a sentence fragment, and
ultimately we want to make the avoidance of error a part of
caring. But we’ve also got to show the student that we are
pleasure-seekers, watching for and responding to positive quality
events: a word well-chosen, a familiar fact seen in a new light,
a sentence that matches its thought neatly, even a footnote at
just the right point and impeccably punctuated. Our marginal
comments ought to be copious, and they ought to show that we
are engaged in his thought process, that we are entertaining it,
not merely poised to pounce on him when his thought deviates
from ours. (What a rotten sense of power Stephen Daedalus s
instructor must have felt when he wrote in the margin This
paper has heresy in it!”) We are trying to establish a community
here, trying to show him we share and take pleasure in his
insights, assuming the best about his writing as long as we
possibly can. Sometimes a certain duplicity may be required: I’ve
had some success pretending to believe that a student chose a
word or advanced a proposition with more skill than was in fact
involved. Especially in a conference with a student, I can get
him to refine an idea in rewriting he didn’t know he had, until it
does in a real sense become his idea, with all the pleasure that
comes with a sense of discovery — a sense, I think, we don’t
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often give a student the chance to feel. However we do it, the
goal IS to clear that minefield, build that community, establish
the sense that we are working toward the common goal of pleasure.
^
The sense of community that the student achieves from having
his paper read by a sympathetic, pleasure-seeking professor is
only part of the caring-about-quality we need to establish with
and for our students. They are going to write (we hope) largely
alone, away from that intersubjective community that emerges
when writer reaches reader. Our student writers need to start
caring as soon as they sit down with that awesome piece of blank
paper in front of them, and we need teaching strategies that will
affect that performance from the outset.
1 have been impressed with two quite different proposals for
the teaching of writing, both of which seem to me quite Pirsigian.
1 suspect an effective college-wide attack on the writing problem
might be devised borrowing from both. Both of them are highly
critical of the current cry that all we need to do is to get Back to
Basics. 1 agree; a sustained attempt to “teach grammar” is
simply a way of building a better minefield.
The first approach is described in a highly readable little
book called Writing and Learning across the Curriculum, 11-16, a
study compiled by Nancy Martin and others of several imaginative
programs in Britain. The key words are “across the curriculum.”
The approach sounds simple-minded: we learn to write by writing
about what we’re interested in. Many of my ideas here about
adopting a pleasure-seeking rather than a mistake-hunting stance
towards paper-marking were influenced by my reading of this book
a year or two ago. Martin and her colleagues are writing about
secondary education in Britain; given our sense that American
college students can’t write very well, we can hardly dismiss the
book as too elementary for our purposes. And the suggestion that
writing should be incorporated with learning across the curriculum
may turn something we’ve thought was a serious problem from the
liberal arts perspective into an opportunity: our concern that our
students are too narrowly career-oriented. If our students care
deeply about nursing or accounting, let us assume that they’d
like to learn to communicate that interest. Perhaps that enchant
ment with the mysteries of double-entry bookkeeping might lead to
a really good essay about it. I’d go further: if a student shows
the slightest interest in anything, assign a paper!
It is not, of course, necessarily going to be an English
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teacher who uncovers that interest. Thus, again, writing across
the curriculum. I have no patience with the argument that chemis
try or business professors can’t teach writing. If you care enough
about good writing to complain bitterly when you discover ugly
bits in bluebooks and termpapers, you have the essential regard
for quality that will enable you to help a student learn to eare as
much as you do: admit that you belong to the community. For one
thing, you can help combat one of the most pernicious results of
our division of the curriculum along disciplinary lines; the
students’ often-confirmed perception that written English is a
language only English teachers care about. That makes it as
difficult to teach written English as it is to teach Japanese in an
environment where the student knows perfectly well he is highly
unlikely ever to need to use the language naturally. Writing and
Learning is full of humane, optimistic, practical advice about
making assignments, responding to papers, and creating a sus
taining, caring educational atmosphere; I recommend it highly.
The second approach, described by Richard A. Lanham in
Style: An Anti-Textbook, is to take a frankly epicurean delight in
language itself. Lanham agrues that composition instruction has
suffered from a moralistic emphasis on “clarity,” in which we
urge the students to “Be Clear” with the same futile fervor of a
preacher urging them to “Be Good.” Lanham argues, persuasively
I think, that few of our utterances are motivated solely by clarity.
The prose that pleases us (as writers and readers) is much more
active and affective than that, full of the desire to express and
flatter ourselves, to adorn our shopworn thoughts for public pur
poses. Lanham maintains that the subject matter of a writing
class should be language itself, its ambiguities, its rhythms, its
mysterious ability to accomplish (and sometimes to baffle) our
complex intentions. Instead of inveighing against jargon, he
urges us to study it, to translate one jargon into another, to learn
what our language sounds like, to play with it, to pun with it,
perform with it. I suspect that there is enough rhetorical tech
nology in this book to make it more useful (or at least more
accessible) to English teachers than to others, but Lanham too
implies ways in which the whole faculty might get involved.
What Lanham is urging is that we consider style “opaque” that is, that we stop trying to read and write as if all that
mattered to us was some fact or concept that the language con
veys, not the language itself. We do react to the style (hence the
frequency of such terms as ‘ elegance even in scientific dis
course): let’s look at it more closely. If at least once a week in
every course on campus, students were forced to slow down in
their mad rush to accumulate knowledge and to examine the
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aual't
which that knowledge was conveyed to them, the
T
^
language itself, we’d have gone a long way
r s s owing them how to care about, how to take pleasure in,
tneir own utterances.
tow

ou an I read a lot; most of us write a lot, even if it’s
os y memos and reports. Presumably one of the reasons we’re
oing this is that we take pleasure in books, in words on a
page
not just from the philosophy or chemistry or pedagogy
a we think we 11 find in or around or under those words,
ertain y most of us suffer pain from the inept, ugly writing our
u ®nts sometimes shamefacedly present for our inspection. Let
us ta e courage from Pirsig: let us confess that, embarrassing as
1
as old-fashioned and pre-Socratic and rhetorical as
you will, we know what we like.
much has happened to us as a language community to
composition problem by a return to Basics. It’s a neat
P oy or college professors and state legislators to blame elemen
tary and secondary English teachers for the abysmal prose many
young adults write today. If kids watch television instead of
rea ing, call longdistance instead of writing to Granny to thank
er for the sweater that didn’t fit, and play the guitar instead of
siting a poem when they fall in love, no amount of sentenceiagramming is going to fill the gap. I don’t have a plan for the
public schools; what I have tried to propose is an attempt to
rescue the victims when they get to college. It must be a collegewide effort, however, an effort to share with our students the
pleasure we take in language well used and to help them learn to
care about the language we enjoy in common.
00
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Larry E. Cox
DICHOTOMIES, DELUSIONS AND DEPRESSION; DELIVERANCE
“What is this man, that we pay so much attention to him
and this man’s son that we cry for him.’

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance^ belongs in a
select genre of literature, one in which personal adaptation and
crisis is the essence of the work and the novel is its form. It is
essential in this genre that the work be largely autobiographical,
the material bubbling up from the unfinished nature of a person
in an immense struggle for integration and pleasure. Other than
Zen, the major work in this area is the often-compared, Moby
Dick. It would be a provocative and difficult task to disucss
what other works should in fact gain admission to this genre;
for while nearly every novel plays on this motif as an enhance
ment of another, few seem to adopt it so starkly as the major
form.
The book’s immense appeal aside from its genius of form is
its authenticity in depicting a struggle for integration that most
of us recognize as the deep resonance of a well-struck chord. To
those who have adopted higher education as the way to search
for answers to the serious predicaments of personal and social
integrity, the metaphor of resonance may seem yet not close
enough. Rather it may seem as though Pirsig and the reader are
playing the same chord simultaneously on somewhat different
instruments. Does this intuitive harmony suggest that Pirsig’s
character somehow represents a more general adaptive difficulty
present in our current culture?
Rollo May, an existential psychiatrist, suggests that by
attending to those persons who become disorganized in a particu
lar culture we can predict the general personal and social
problems that will, with time, predominate. The notion is that
persons particularly sensitive to a given stress respond most
adversely thus becoming harbingers of things to come for the
general populace. If this is probable, then Pirsig’s dilemma and
the vicarious struggle most readers report call for an honest
assessment of Phaedrus/Pirsig.
iRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An
Inquiry into Values (New York: Bantam Books, 1976). All quotations
from this book are designated by page number in the body of the paper.
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In this essay I will attempt a clinical assessment of the
personality revealed in the book. Since a complete clinical
analysis would be nearly as lengthy as the book, I will neces
sarily be sharing only a sample of the salient material. I
the process to you as a provocation to your own analysis. While
I offer It with a modesty to which any experienced clinician with
scores of analytic misjudgments and cul-de-sacs must confess, I
likewise offer it with a confidence gained from intuiting accur
ately on numerous occasions.
Z,en is not an attack on reason. It demonstrates the difficulty
a person dedicated to “pure reason” has integrating the nonrational aspects of his person - particularly the emotional
aspects. As Pirsig says of Socrates dialogue of the One, “• • •
the seeker, trying to reach the One is drawn by two borses, one
white and noble and temperate, and tbe other surly, stubborn,
passionate and black. The one is forever aiding him in h'®
upward journey to the portals of heaven, the other is forever
confounding him” (p. 382). Dichotomies such as this, and the
process of creating such dichotomies as a major personal style
of understanding, create immense adaptive strain. In the healthy
personality such dichotomies are viewed as polarities and syn
thesis or integration achieves the necessary balance. For
example, persons who conceptualize themselves and others in
terms of strength and weakness often choose to identify with
strength or weakness predominantly. When this habitual identifi
cation with strength or weakness is threatened — when the strong
person must recognize weakness or the weak person must do
something calling for strength, crisis is imminent. For the person
comfortable with elements of each within, synthesized and demon
strated in everyday affairs, crisis is often averted and personal
vitality evident.
Dichotomizing often leads to the creation of delusions. Dichot
omies implore us to allegiance. We must decide — to be or not to
be, to sell or not to sell, to kill or not to kill. While there are
positive elements to such definition, nearly always the decision
suffers from lack of awareness of contextual realities. As often
as I have shared decisive moments with clients deliberating
suicide, 1 am even more awestruck than ever, at the sharp focus
on a single issue such a struggle represents. Life has come down
to a single intellectual choice, to go on or to end it. To go on
represents probable suffering and misery; to end it means relief
and in some sense probable pleasure. Reality is relatively unim
portant at that moment; the decision will more than likely be
reached on the basis of delusion, some belief concocted and
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accepted at that moment.
Phaedrus moves from dichotomy to (p. 339-340) delusion in
such a way.
He had become so caught up in his world of Quality meta
physics he couldn’t see outside it anymore and since no one
else understood this world, he was already done for.
I think he must have felt at the time that what he was saying
was true and it didn’t matter if his manner of presentation
was outrageous or not . . .
This was it. He really believed ... It was a totally fanatic
thing. He lived in a solitary universe of discourse in those
days.

Few persons reach this level of delusion. Instead some flock to
others who share their belief system. While this is nearly the
same thing if the belief system is quite homogenous, there is a
different reality about consensus. While being angry towards
those outside of the belief system you can nevertheless share
pleasure with those inside.
Since the world is rarely as simple as our delusions of belief
systems would indicate, most delusional people experience
eventual depression when the walls separating the dichotomies
begin to leak. It’s as if some self-correcting force exists inde
pendently and chisels away at weak spots in the wall. Attention
then must be directed almost exclusively at the wall, its repair
and maintenance. Since there is no growth in that, productive
activity ceases and despair takes over. This is evident in
Phaedrus’ definition of the mythos (p. 345).
The mythos grows this way. By analogies to what is known
before. The mythos is a building of analogues upon ana
logues upon analogues. These fill the boxcars of the train of
consciousness. [Notice the parallel to the development of a
delusional system.] The mythos is the whole train of col
lective unconscious of all communicating mankind. Every
last bit of it. [What a force to have on the other side of the
wall.] The Quality is the track that directs the train. What
is outside the train, to either side - that is the terra
incognita of the insane. He knew that to understand Quality
he would have to leave the mythos. That’s why he felt that
slippage. He knew something was about to happen, (p. 344).

Phaedrus had earlier declared that “to go outside the mythos is
to become insane.” That definition of reality and the accompany
ing fear led Phaedrus into despair, then to frenzied activity of
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him anfi f
attacks on all those forces which threatened
''■m, and finally to total depression.
Despair
grows now (p. 325).
\t> r
^jrived at the University of Chicaffo already
a wor of thought so different from the one you or I
understand (p. 331).
Hostility
Hostility is really his element . . . down from the
mountains to prey upon the poor innocent citizens of this
intellectual community (p. 386). [All of whom to Phaedrus
were absorbed in the mythos.]

a

lines are defined quickly. And the analogy to a classic
e or survival among lower animals is striking.
doorway there
ae rus suddenly knows
IS an s start to shake.
stands none other than the
PI,

are some footsteps, and then
— and his legs turn rubbery and
Smiling benignly in the doorway
Chairman.

• Courtly, grand, with imperial magnanimity (p. 379).

e perceives the other students as having seats in the arena,
e student whom the chairman had previously ridiculed is seen
seat to the beating up of Phaedrus. The attack
Will begin, he thinks, with an attempt to “destroy his status
ialectically
and when he finished off he will be asked to
shape up or act out.” As the real battle wages Phaedrus, dis
guised in a beard, begins to gain courage. He is well into the
dialogue of the class before the Chairman recognizes him —
gleam in his eye shows he recognizes who his bearded assailant
IS.
The struggle continues. The Chairman commits a blunder in
interpretation and Phaedrus seizes the opportunity and “raises
his hand, palm flat out, elbow on the table. Where before his hand
was shaking it is now deadly calm” (p. 383), Phaedrus delivers
his blow, his whole survival at stake, lie bides his time then
strikes again. “The Chairman falters and hesitates, acts afraid
of his class and does not really engage them” (p. 384). The
student on the sideline now enters the fracus, seething in pent
up anger. Phaedrus delivers another brutal attack and the fight
ends. Hut victory is sweet for a very short time. There is a lack
of authenticity in his overstated hostility and Phaedrus knows it.
Ihe next day we find him “making one last attempt somehow to
be nice at the next session of the class but the Chairman isn’t
having any.” Unlike the battle of the lower animals where
dominance is clearly established the victory here brings great
despair.
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Meanwhile at the Navy Pier the students are fascinated with
Phaedrus. They are eager to hear this “strange bearded figure
from the mountains.” If simple recognition had been his goal this
clearly would have held him in good stead but the issue he waged
was much different. To have given into such wooing of popularity
would have been to give in somehow to the mythos.
Phaedrus “is no shepherd either and the strain of behaving
like one is killing him ... his days as a shepherd are coming to
an end too. And he wonders more and more what is going to
happen next.” The last spiral toward the bottom picks up speed.
Note the passivity and spectator quality that characterizes him
in the previous quotation. The small flicker of remaining hostility
is now directed towards the classroom. “It is not his nature to
talk and talk and talk for hours on end and it exhausts him to do
this, and now having nothing left to turn upon, he turns upon this
fear.” He comes to the classroom and sits in silence. Class after
class.

Psychotic Depression
Thus is ushered in deep depression with its characteristic
symptoms. Sleep time has dwindled to nothing. The city closes
in on him. He wandres aimlessly for three days and finally ends
up back in the apartment staring at the wall. He is no longer
responsive to others. His thoughts are slowing down. His percep
tion of his own body undergoes bizarre changes. Cigarettes burn
themselves out between his fingers with no indication that he
feels them. He sits in his own urine. Yet even in such a state
the climax comes with his realization that “his whole conscious
ness, the mythos, has been a dream and no one’s dream but his
own, a dream he must now sustain at his own efforts. Then even
‘he’ disappears and only the dream of himself remains with him
self in it.” (p. 391).
I don’t believe I have ever read a more adequate description
of depression and particularly of the demise of the fragmented
ego that supports this sort of consciousness. It is an accurate
picture, one that occurs again and again but a view which usually
occurs in the perspective of the clinician or aware family-member
who sees the symbolism behind the obvious behaviors. Here we
have a striking description of the progressive changes in con
sciousness that in some eerie sense reverse the order of the way
consciousness develops in the infant, culminating in a unique
moment of unbirth described in what I consider one of the two or
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three most poignant passages in the book.
never betravpr?**K^?^’

fought so hard for, has

now makes itse’lf c” eaJ to
dT'^ has never once understood,
Clear to him and his soul is at rest.” (p. 391).
Deliverance:
nicks nr!'*'
back at the
iournev P’ '
inteerItio^"wh^
deliisin
nnlarJt

of its unique form the story
^P'
rather
We 11 call the man on the motorcycle
journey is a search for an illusive self-

I

oi^phasis on dichotomy is tempered and his
f^^^'t'es minimal (perhaps the beginning sense of
emerging) integration appears only as a very distant
possibility. Pirsig describes himself in fact as
saved liis^
® recanted, and thereby in everyone’s eyes
down insid 'll! ' 'jeryone s eyes but one who knows deep
down inside that all he has saved is his skin.
I survive mainly by pleasing others. You do that to get
and’ .1.°
^‘Rdre out what they want you to say
nnsaiKr"
much skill and originality as
fp. 3%)! "
convinced, you get out

But I believe his behavior was chosen for other than the pure
deception of others. He is trying on the other polarities. He
continues;
If 1 hadn’t turned on him I’d still be there, but he was true
to what he believed right to the end. That’s the difference
between us, and Chris knows it. And that’s the reason why
sometimes [ feel he’s the reality and I’m the ghost.

The prospects of reintegration are very awesome to Pirsig.
Recognition of Phaedrus brings the renewed threat of insanity,
but the desire for integration, perhaps the need for integration,
makes it impossible to leave Phaedrus alone. What an awesome
position. Ibw frightening and all-encompassing is the dilemma.
E.arly in the journey (p. 62) Pirsig has a dream which clearly
indicates his level of fear of Phaedrus and paints a picture of
Pirsig’s defense against it.
In the fog there appears an intimation of a figure ... I am
about to say something, to call to it, to recognize it, but
then do not, knowing that to recognize it by any gesture or
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action is to give it a reality which it must not have. But it
is a figure I recognize even though I do not let on. It is
Phaedrus.
Evil spirit. Insane. From a world without life or death.

The figure fades and 1 hold a panic down . . . tight . . .
not rushing it . . . just letting it sink in . . . not believing
it, not disbelieving it . . . but the hair crawls slowly on the
back of my skull ... he is calling Chris . . .

While this behavior indicates unreasonable fear it is also a part
of the healing process. He must let Phaedrus through but he must
do it in manageable bits. Note in particular the movement away
from delusion — “not believing it, not disbelieving it,” thus
trying to experience the phenomenon for what it is.
Pirsig has also begun to apply the principles of Zen he has
garnered from his time in the Orient. He has learned that a here
and now time orientation is critical to successful adaptation.
This is a concept emphasized in most current psychotherapy.
Persons predominantly oriented toward the past or future cannot
experience and understand the ^present. Pirsig develops this
insight in his comparison between ego-climbing and selfless
climbing (p. 206). While
to the untrained eye they may appear identical . . . what a
difference. The ego-climber is like an instrument that’s out
of adjustment. He puts his foot down an instant too soon or
too late. He’s likely to miss a beautiful passage of sunlight
through the trees . . . He looks up the trail trying to see
what’s ahead even when he knows what’s ahead because he
just looked a second before . . . He’s here but he’s not
here. He rejects the here, is unhappy with it, wants to be
farther up the trail but when he gets there will be just as
unhappy because then it will be “here.” What he’s looking
for what he wants, is all around him; but he doesn’t want
that because it is all around him. Every step’s an effort,
both physically and spiritually, because he imagines his
goal to he external and distant.

As the parallel journeys of Pirsig and Phaedrus roll on, Pirsig
is aware of Phaedrus’ obsessiveness and resolves to be different
(p. 217).
He (Phaedrus) wasn’t interested in any kind of fusion of
differences between these two worlds. He was after some
thing else — his ghost. 1 (Pirsig) differ from him in that I’ve
no intention of going on to that end. He just passed through
this territory and opened it up. 1 intend to stay and cultivate
it and see if 1 can get something to grow.
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Productivity — growth, Pirsig is no longer focused on th®
I’o the careful reader his growing strength is evident but somehow
masked by the parallel account of Phaedrus who, at this juncture,
is in the stage of despair. He is more ready now to allow th®
image of Phaedrus to become distinct. The difficulty of t e
integration is clear. Phaedrus is the one of Quality and Pirstg
awakes from another frightening dream to see that
He’s waking up. A mind divided against itself . . . me . • •
I’m the loathsome one ... I always knew he would come
back . . . It’s a matter of preparing for it . . . (p. 325).

Phaedrus is so much with him now, almost indistinguishable an
the expectation of the accompanying insanity is nearly too much.
But again this is a different journey. Pirsig, taking in
beauty around him, capturing the newness of his existence, seems
to shout a growing awareness in the form of a question.
can I love all this so much and be insane? 1 don’t believe itBoth Phaedrus and Pirsig then agree, are unified in the recogni
tion that “the mythos is insane.’’ “The mythos that says the
forms of this world are real but the Quality of this world is
unreal, that is insane.”
That. That now. That ties it all together. It feels relieving
when that happens (p. 346).

But Pirsig is not easily convinced. Reality is fuzzy. He can t
quite accept this level of integration. It is somehow still role
like and ill-fitting. But the scene is now set for the final integra
tion, this one centering on the most cherished concern of both
Phaedrus and Pirsig — Chris. (How I would love to stop and deal
with the development of this relationship, but I will suggest only
the drama of the relationship in the finale and urge you to go back
and mine the beauty that is there.) Both Phaedrus and Pirsig
have frequently called out to him in caring unutterable groans.
It is near the end of the trip. Chris has become nearly
unmanageable. Pirsig is angry, afraid and then struck with a deep
awareness (p. 345).
I can imitate the father he’s supposed to have, but sub
consciously, at the Quality level, he sees through it and
knows his real father isn’t here. In all this Chautauqua talk
there’s been more than a touch of hypocrisy. Advice is given
again and again to eliminate subject-object duality, when
the biggest duality of all, the duality between me and him,
remains unfaced. A mind divided against itself.

But with the recognition of the division, Pirsig still sees no way
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to undo the division. The intellectual bed is made. Reason has
done its part. It is left for emotion to pull down the covers and
welcome the struggling parts to rest together. As Pirsig shares
his most intimate fears with Chris, the boy stands imploding
against the most terrifying possibility of loss in the universe,
one he knows so well in a not too distant memory. He shrieks
with a shriek so congruent with the pain he feels that it pene
trates to the very soul of his fathers (p. 401).
I don’t know what to do now. I have no idea what to do.
It’s all over. I want to run for the cliff, but fight that. I have
to get him on the bus and then the cliff will he all right.
Everything is all right now, Chris. That’s not my
voice. / haven't forgotten you . . . How could I forget
you . . . We'll be together now . . .

The integration is complete. The voice validates the integra
tion Pirsig has been searching out. Growth is again possible.
The storm has passed. Chris asks a critical question “Were you
really insane” and the answer comes out like the clean smell
after the rain. “No” . . . Chris’s eyes sparkle. “1 knew it” he
says.
I would like to believe at this point that Pirsig is alive and
well and living in the Azores, or anywhere. All my attempts to
discover his whereabouts have turned up nothing. His publishers
have no address and there are no disciples in the publishing
house who seem to care. Apparently the rumor that he committed
suicide is untrue. Perhaps it was created by some perverse spirit
who wanted to dash our belief in integration against the dividing
wall of dualism. I feel at this moment somehow repentant that I
could have believed such a rumor. While my clinical realism,
grown out of the soil of prevalence, incidence and prognosis data
reminds me of how hard it is for such integration to occur in such
a personality, there is some deep internal sense that Quality will
tip the seemingly uneven scales in the direction of integrity.
In Pirsig’s latest writing in Esquire in 1977, Pirsig is still
together. He has exchanged motorcycle for sailboat but he’s still
dealing with the topic of depression. The integration theme is
stronger here — he’s integrating everything in sight (p. 68).
This self that one discovers (when sailing for long periods
of time) is in many ways a person one would not like one’s
friends to know about; a person one may have been avoiding
for years, full of vanity, cowardice, boredom, self-pity,
laziness, blamingness, weak when he should be strong.
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aggressive when he should be gentle, a person w o wi
anything not to know these things about himself
^ ^
same fellow who has been having problems with cruising
depression all this time. I think it’s in the day-after- ay,
week-after-week confrontation of this person that the mos
valuable learning of virtue takes place.
But if one will allow time enough ... a certain
standing of one’s self will break through . • •
f i
you are bored or exicted, depressed or elated, successtu or
unsuccessful, even whether you are alive or dead, all t is
is of absolutely no consequence whatsoever.

This ending while perhaps more cynical and more Sartre-like
very similar to his major advice, his psychotherapeutic pre
•iption in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
So the thing to do when working on a motorcycle, as in any
other task, is to cultivate the peace of mind which does not
separate one’s self from one’s surroundings (including is
other selves). When that is done successfully then every
thing else follows naturally” (p. 290).

Paul L. Redditt
THE LOTUS AND THE WRENCH *
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF
ZEN BUDOHISM ON ROBERT M. PIRSIG

The title of Pirsig’s book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance would seem to invite if not demand a comparison of
Pirsig’s thought with Zen Buddhist thinking. Accordingly, the
thesis of this study is that Pirsig’s thought can be partially
explained and evaluated from the perspective of Zen fduddhism.
Before one even begins that explication, however, a disclaimer
immediately following the title page of the book must be
addressed. Pirsig writes;
What follows is based on actual occurrences. Although much
has been changed for rhetorical purposes, it must be
regarded in its essence as fact. However, it should in no
way be associated with that great body of factual informa
tion relating to orthodox Zen Buddhist practice. It’s not
very factual on motorcycles, either,1

Pirsig explicitly denies that what follows in his book is factual
about Zen or motorcycles, despite the title of the work. We have
then a book which purports to be fact but not factual about its
title. But if the book is not “factual” about Zen or motorcycles
as scholars or technicians understand “factual,” it does neverthe less deal with the “fact” of persons, motorcycles, and Zen
in that existential crucible of experience, the college of hard
knocks, in which Pirsig has tried, tested and “proved” his
“facts.” Pirsig thus assumes the right to speak to us of Zen and
motorcycles, of romance and technology; he assumes the right to
speak to us of the art (not the technology) of motorcycle mainte
nance. In short, Pirsig denies the very dichotomies which he
thinks tear the fabric of our society. He speaks instead from a
vision which unifies all dichotomies. This vision, tested both in

*The title of this paper is derived from the recurring image of a lotus
(a Buddhist symbol) with an open end wrench protruding from it. This
symbol appears on the cover and at the beginning of each chapter in the
Bantam edition of Zen and the Art oj Motorcycle Maintenance.
IRobert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance; An
Inquiry into Values (New York: A Bantam Book, 1976). All quotes from
Pirsig are from this edition and are hereafter cited in the text of the
paper by page number.
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the Church of Reason (his term for the university setting), in the
Cuckoo’s Nest (Pirsig was once admitted to a mental hospital),
and on the back of a motorcycle, is more Eastern than Western,
more Zen than Christian in its emphasis on monism. Perhaps,
then, it will further our understanding of Pirsig if we test Pirsig’s
Zen “facts” against that factual body of Zen Buddhist thought
and practice.
In the pursuit of Pirsig’s Zen (if there is such a thing as an
idiosyncratic Zen), I propose the following steps; first we shall
note his initial acquaintance with Eastern ideas and review how
Pirsig describes Phaedrus’ (Pirsig’s name for himself before his
mental collapse) salori or enlightened breakthrough to his vision.
Our next three steps will follow him along the way of Zen, artic
ulating Pirsig’s insight with regard to the insufficiency of
reason, the unity of knowledge, and the importance of the present.
Our fifth step, unfortunately, will land us in a pitfall (as judged
from a Zen perspective) that Pirsig did not avoid. Finally we will
conclude by taking stock of ourselves as we assess the implica
tions of Pirsig’s work.
/. Initial encounters with Eastern thought
For a book employing the name Zen in its title, Pirsig’s essay
makes surprisingly few direct references to Zen Buddhism or to
Eastern thought more generally. Among those references, how
ever, are several that indicate Pirsig’s early contacts with
Oriental philosophy. During Pirsig’s early adulthood (i.e. after
being expelled from the University), he served in Korea with the
United States Army. His contact with things oriental — sliding
doors, slate roofs, and open marketplaces — filled him with
emotion. In addition he met and conversed with Korean laborers.
But most importantly he read F. S. C. Northrup, The Meeting of
East and West, which caused Pirsig to see the dichotomized
existence of Western man. Northrup proposed that, instead of
thinking in dichotomies. Westerns would do well to learn to think
in continua. I'hat is, the either/or emphasis of Western dialeetieal
thinking should be replaced with the both/and emphasis of
Eastern thinking. Pirsig’s second contact with the East included
living and studying in India just long enough to be completely
repulsed by the Indian notion that the phenomena of this world
are actually only temporary, hence illusory, appearances of the
underlying one. Thus a possible source for learning about unified
vision of knowledge was rejected by young Phaedrus because of
his conviction of the reality of war and atrocity.
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Precisely how and when Pirsig narrowed his Eastern focus
and began to study Zen and to what extent he pursued that study
he does not tell us. When, however, he comes to describe
Phaedrus’ breakthrough, his discovery of Quality, Pirsig’s
language and even the structure of his essay take on overtones of
the Zen experience of enlightenment called satori. Two passages
in particular attract my attention. Chris and Pirsig are climbing a
mountain overlooking Bozeman, Montana where Phaedrus had
taught rhetoric at Montana State College. Pirsig is interweaving
Phaedrus’ discovery of Quality, the concept which unifies all
dichotomies in Pirsig’s thought, with his narrative of his return
to Bozeman. Phaedrus had come so far as to discern three prin
ciples behind the world: mind, matter, and Quality (p, 232).
Phaedrus examines this “Trinity” closer:
I don’t know how much thought passed before he arrived at
this, but eventually he saw that Quality couldn’t be inde
pendently related with either the subject or the object but
could be found only in the relationship of the two with each
other. It is the point at which subject and object meet.
That sounded warm.
Quality is not a thing. It is an event.
Warmer.
It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the
object.
And because without objects there can be no subject —
because the objects create the subject’s awareness of him
self — Quality is the event at which awareness of both
subjects and objects is made possible.
Hot,
Now he knew it was coming.
Tliis means Quality is not just the result of a collision
between subject and object. The very existence of subject
and object themselves is deduced from the Quality event.
The Quality event is the cause of the subjects and objects
which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the
Quality (pp. 233-4).
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Here is the heart of Phaedrus’ discovery I et
j n r.
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the event o the discovery itself. Phaedrus had pursued Quality
as a thing. He came to realize that it is an event; it is the reali
zation of the contindua Northrup wrote about PtmoJ
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the analytical process, had run its course and intuitive insight
had emerged. Now Phaedrus reversed the direction
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his thinking;
he reasoned from, not to. Quality. As 1 understand Pirsig Qualit
is not the object of intellectual pursuit; it is the event or the
vista from which all intellectual pursuit begins It
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11 IS not the con
clusion of the syllogism but the major premise. Because there is
Quality there are subject and object, mind and matter. Phaedrus
had searched for Quality until it found him, and he “saw” for the
first time. What he saw was that there is no seer without a seen;
there is no seen without a seer; there is only the process of see
ing, only the continuum and not the dichotomy.
Pirsig reinforces his presentation of this breakthrough by
means of the structure of the story he writes. Just at the point
Pirsig tells of Phaedrus’ insight, his solving of the dilemma,
Chris climbs above the treeline of the mountain they are climbing
and shouts: “Blue sky!” They race to the summit and there —
from their new perspective — the mountain, the forest, and the
valley lie below them, and they see clearly the whole picture,
the whole lay of the land, for the first time.
Zen, however, does not put any stock in living on mountain
tops. As D. T. Suzuki once put it: “F'irst you’ve got to get on
the camel; then you’ve got to get off the camel.” Pirsig recog
nizes this: “...there are no motorcycles on the tops of mountains,
and in my opinion very little Zen. Zen is the “spirit of the
valley, not the mountain. The only Zen you find on the top of
mountains is the Zen you bring up there” (p. 240). So Chris and
Pirsig descend the mountain, but the Chautauqua continues as
Pirsig recounts in more detail Phaedrus’ realization of his
insight.
Then, on impulse, Phaedrus went over to his bookshelf and
picked out a small, blue, cardboardbound book. He’d handcopied this book and bound it himself years before when he
couldn’t find a copy for sale anywhere. It was the 2400year-old Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu. He began to read through
the lines he had read many times before, but this time he
studied it to see if a certain substitution would work. He
began to read and interpret it at the same time.
He read (from the opening chapter of the Tao Te Ching)*:
The

quality that

can be defined is not
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the Absolute

Quality.
That was what he had said.
The names that can be given it are not absolute names.
It is the origin of heaven and earth . . .
Phaedrus read on through line after line, verse after verse
of this, watched them match, fit, slip into place. Exactly.
This was what he meant. This was what he*d been saying
all along, only poorly, mechanistically. There was nothing
vague or inexact about this book, it was as precise and
definite as it could be. It was what he had been saying only
in a different language with different roots and origins. He
was from another valley seeing what was in this valley, not
now as a story told by strangers but as a part of the valley
he was from. He was seeing it all (pp. 246-8).

* (Citation by the author of this essay.)
To be sure Pirsig speaks in this passage not of a Zen text,
but of the Tao Te Ching, the seminal text of philosophical
Taoism. I'here is, though, a sense in which Zen Buddhism is
Indian Buddhist meditation filtered through Chinese Taoist
thought. If Pirsig could substitute the word “Quality” for the
word “'I'ao” in the text, a Zen Buddhist would be pleased to
substitute the term “Buddha Nature,” the underlying Reality
which resolves all dichtomies in Zen monism. Pirsig’s text was
Taoist, but his thought had been appropriated from the Tao Te
Ching Buddhists centuries before. Phaedrus’ experience, then,
is cast by Pirsig as a Zen enlightenment, the granting of a new
insight that (so Zen Buddhists say) allows one to see the world
and everything in it for the first time. The contents of this Zen
vision are not transferable by words, only by experience: Never
theless Zen Buddhists from time to time attempt to give us
glimpses of that new vision. At least three very typical com
ponents of that vision appear in Pirsig. To those components let
us now turn our attention.
II. The insufficiency of reason
The positing of Quality as the a priori category has as its
first consequence (or perhaps its first cause) the insufficiency of
reason. In his dialogue with DeWeese, Phaedrus complains that
analytical reason, dialectic reason, is often held to be the whole
truth, but in fact does not prepare us to deal with the whole of
our experience (p. 165). Dualistic, rational thinking will always
get stuck (p. 277); indeed analysis can never deliver the whole
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